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Abstract
Both research community and industry believe that Intelligent Transportation
System (ITS) would be achievable in the next decade. ITS introduces informa-
tion technology for the transportation vehicles and infrastructures and aims to
improve road safety and traffic efficiency. Vehicular Communication Systems
(VCS), provides a platform for the vehicles to exchange messages with network
infrastructures (V2I) or other vehicles (V2V). Confidence in these messages can
be achieved through secure group messaging. Furthermore, the reliability of ITS
highly relies on the security level of VCS. Therefore, secure key management
schemes are proposed to enhance network security, which involves two aspects,
namely Group Key Management (GKM) and Key Handover which also known as
key transfer. The first part manages keys among a communication group within
small road area, whereas key handover transfers secret keys from one security
domain to another. Three contributions related to secure key management are as
follows.
The first contribution focuses on managing group communication keys in an
efficient way. The probability-based scheme describes a novel GKM scheme us-
ing leaving probabilities of vehicles to optimise the structure of key tree branches.
The proposed scheme further decreases rekeying costs and releases network re-
sources.
The second contribution introduces the Distributed Ledger Technology (DLT)
structure to simplify the key handover procedures between heterogeneous net-
works. The central managers are eliminated from the key handover participation
list. The key handover data are encapsulated into transactions and the Blockchain
is maintained by all the infrastructures distributively.
Finally, the dynamic transaction collection period is replenished to further op-
timise the performance based on the framework in the second contribution. The
collection period varies dynamically to flexibly fit the traffic level on the road.
The scheme aims to raise key handover efficiency at peak hours, while reducing
the computation burden at off-peak hours.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
In this first chapter, the work carried out in this thesis is introduced. The research
motivation is first presented to clarify the necessity of the key management re-
search in Vehicular Communication System (VCS). Then, some discussion about
the goals to be met is illustrated. Finally, contributions achieved during our re-
search study and the thesis structure are introduced.
1.1 Research Motivations
A recent report from U.S Department of Transport (DoT) shows that 82% of the
accidents can be prevented by using Intelligent Transportation System (ITS) [1].
ITS is proposed as the only candidate to solve the current problems within the
transportation systems, such as road safety and congestion control. As a submod-
ule of the ITS, VCS is one of the most important components of the Internet of
Things (IoT) network. The VCS supports the exchange of messages between ve-
hicles and also with infrastructure facilities [2]. One of the most well-known VCS
structures is called Vehicular Ad-hoc Networks (VANET). As an extension of Mo-
bile Ad-hoc Network (MANET), VANET offers a platform among ITS for vehi-
cles to exchange different kinds of messages such as safety notification messages.
In addition to the message exchange among multiple vehicles, VCS supports mes-
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sage communications between vehicle and infrastructure as well, therefore the rest
of the thesis uses VCS to stand the vehicular communication platform in ITS. With
the help of VCS, ITS can offer a more safe and efficient traffic management.
ITS and VCS security and accident avoiding issues highly rely on the ex-
change of safety messages: vehicles can obtain a better understanding of current
road situation and traffic model based on the information contained in safety mes-
sages from nearby vehicles. For this reason, the problem of providing ITS and
VCS security can be mapped into the problem of how to broadcast secured and
authenticated safety messages among all the communication participants. The
current solution to achieve trusted safety message exchange among the VCS area
is to encrypt and authenticate the message [3] before broadcasting the message
to VCS. However, the first to achieve encrypted safety message exchange is to
distribute secret keys in a safe manner, that is, key management. Even though
significant developments have taken place over the past few years in the area of
VCS, security issues, especially in the area of the key management schemes are
still an important topic of research. Fig.1.1 gives an outline about the position of
the research topic of the thesis with respect to the entire ITS system.
Figure 1.1: The Relation Between the Research Motivation and Intelligent Trans-
portation System (ITS)
2
1.2 Research Objectives
The security research work aims to establish a novel security techniques for key
management in a large volume of VCS service participants. The current key man-
agement can provide acceptable security level, but at the expense of the network
overheads and computation efficiency. These two aspects are the major difficul-
ties of the key management research. Thus the first aim of the key management
research is to reduce the overall broadcast messages, also known as the commu-
nication overhead. Whereas the second aim is to speed up the key management
processing time. The second objective can be carried out by optimising the rekey-
ing algorithm so that fewer computation procedures are required.
The primary aims of this thesis are to propose key management schemes that
are capable to overcome the above difficulties to some extent. The VCS key man-
agement schemes should satisfy the objectives below:
• Minimise the number of rekeying messages (Also known as the Communica-
tion overheads or Rekeying cost) compared to the previous key management
schemes.
• The key management schemes for VCS should have flexibility, scalability and
dynamic algorithms in order to cope with various traffic situations.
• The key management mechanisms are able to manage keys over heterogeneous
VCS networks, which are individual security domains, such as cities or
country boundaries.
• Minimise the number of secret keys stored in the mobile nodes and infrastruc-
tures.
1.3 Thesis Contributions
Three contributions are contained in this thesis which are detailed as follows:
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First, a probability-based key management scheme for VCS networks is pro-
posed. A novel Group Key Management (GKM) is proposed to reduce the num-
ber of rekeying messages. The vehicle leaving probability parameter helps the
key manager to predict the future movement trajectory of vehicles. The position
of the vehicle in the key tree is decided according to the leaving probability to
restrict most of the departing vehicles within a small area on the key tree. This
can significantly decrease the amount and length of rekeying messages, as well as
the computation burden.
Secondly, a Distribution Ledger Technology (DLT) and blockchain based key
management scheme for VCS network have been proposed as the second contri-
bution in this thesis. Two algorithms are specified for the blockchain mining and
key handover. This scheme aims to shorten the processing time for key manage-
ment when secret keys need to be transferred between heterogeneous regions. To
the best of our knowledge, the DLT-based decentralised structure is the first to
be considered to optimise the network security structure. The simplified structure
neglects the unnecessary key handover handshake procedures and accelerates the
key transfer.
The third contribution focuses on minimising processing time of key manage-
ment using a dynamic approach. Specifically speaking, the length of the transac-
tion collection period varies depending on various traffic levels. After the DLT-
based decentralised network structure is proposed in the second contribution, this
contribution further improves the performance of key management. The dynamic
transaction collection periods control the transaction number to minimise the key
handover time with respect to various traffic levels.
1.4 Thesis Structure
The remainder of this thesis is organised as follows:
The Chapter 2 and Chapter 3 presents the background and related literature
review of the ITS environment and VCS networks. The background contains the
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parent modules of VCS, key technologies of VCS and general security issues of
VCS. The literature review part displays not only the detailed introduction of VCS
protocol stacks, as well as descriptions of VCS-based cryptography, authentica-
tion and key management techniques. The cutting-edge DLT and privacy in VCS
are discussed as well.
Chapter 4 develops a key management scheme based on the existing schemes.
The leaving probability is attached to the scheme in order to optimise the original
scheme. The overall number and the length of rekeying messages are decreased.
Thus the efficiency of key management procedures is enhanced. The network
bandwidth and computation resources are saved so that more nodes can be sup-
ported to cope with large scale VCS environments.
The scenario description, assumption and result analysis of the second contri-
bution are discussed in Chapter 5. The decentralised DLT structure and key han-
dover algorithm are specified in this Chapter. As the first contribution involves
the DLT, this chapter provides an initial framework of the distributed key man-
agement. The performances are compared to the conventional network to show
the advantages of the new framework.
Chapter 6 introduces the proposed algorithm to collect transaction dynami-
cally. This chapter builds the scheme based on the second contribution. Dynamic
elements are introduced into the scheme so that the network knows the rule to find
the proper transaction collection period length. The performance evaluation has
been conducted to discover the improvements of this scheme with respect to the
static scheme.
Finally, Chapter 7 concludes the thesis and proposes some possible future re-
search plan in the VCS security and privacy field.
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Chapter 2
Background of ITS and VCS
In this chapter, the overview of the characteristics that related to the thesis topic is
illustrated. The sequence of the characteristics is organised from macro to micro.
The background of Intelligent Intelligent Transportation System (ITS) is intro-
duced in the first place, aiming to draw an outline of the entire system. Communi-
cation techniques and protocols of the Vehicular Communication System (VCS)
take the second place. Finally, various state-of-the-art security enhancement tech-
niques are discussed as follows.
2.1 Cyber-Physical System (CPS)
The concept of the Internet of Things (IoT) arises the general interest in the Cyber-
Physical System (CPS). CPS refers to a hardware system that all the hardware
devices are centrally managed by computer and computer algorithms. Users and
infrastructures are connected to the Internet through either a cable connection or
wireless network. CPS has various use cases, including ITS, smart grid, smart
meters, smart medical systems and smart cities. These use cases assist living, im-
prove safety and release traffic jam. Components in CPS are classified as physical
part and software part [4]. Physical components include infrastructures, network
sensors and computation devices. The framework of CPS is supported by placing
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physical components at each key position. Software components contain pro-
gramme, software operating systems and the IoT network environment. Software
components fill the space of CPS based on the framework. Take the ITS as an ex-
ample scenario, physical components are autonomous vehicles, roadside commu-
nication base stations, traffic monitoring gantries and the on-board computation
devices, while the software includes but not limited to the wireless communi-
cation environment, safety messages, traffic navigation services and commercial
services.
However, challenges hide in the positive impact of CPS. Requirements in CPS
include resiliency, reliability, Quality of Service (QoS) and security [5]. Engineers
first consider to set up the entire CPS system and make sure the system is running
well, involving in the reliability of the hardware devices and the information ex-
change platform. After that, major challenges about the software of CPS have
been conducted in the computer algorithm and the higher layer communication
protocols to connect devices. Specifically speaking, enhancing the security and
privacy, as well as system efficiency are the key challenges [6] [7]. For instance,
Wireless Sensor Network (WSN) is a well-known CPS use case, the system first
starts to support basic message exchange functions. Then, security schemes are
attached to provide access control in order to bring security into the system. In
addition, efficiency-driven security schemes are proposed due to the fact that the
energy-constrained characteristic of WSN [8].
2.2 Technologies for ITS Communication Systems
2.2.1 Vehicular Ad-hoc Networks (VANET)
The Vehicular ad-hoc Network (VANET) concept has considered for more than 30
years since the 1980s [9]. Similar to the relationship between CPS and ITS, the
parent concept of VANET is MANET. The idea of VANET aims to create a net-
work which supports safety message exchange with vehicular nodes (Vehicle-to-
Vehicle, V2V). Commercial purposes such as commercial traffic navigation ser-
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vices using VANET are extended based on the basic functions. The message prop-
agation method is assumed to use ad-hoc based multi-hop communications. That
means a message can be relayed to reach far distance by jumping multi-hops [10].
However, the idea of ITS spans across a whole range of applications which is clas-
sified into not only V2V communications, but Vehicle-to-Infrastructure (V2I) as
well. The concept of V2I communications is already beyond the field of Ad-Hoc
network [9]. Moreover, vehicles connect to the base station infrastructures occa-
sionally using WLAN or cellular connection. For this reason, the word ’ad-hoc’
in VANET cannot describe the network structure properly. The V2V and V2I are
classified as part of the Vehicle-to-Any or the Vehicle-to-Everything (V2X) com-
munications, the concept of V2X is a Vehicular Communication System (VCS)
that contains multiple vehicle-centric scenarios, such as Vehicle-to-Device (V2D).
Beyond the field of V2X, VCS includes extra connections between infrastructures.
For this reason, some of the researchers prefer to use the name VCS to represent
vehicular communication networks in a more professional style.
2.2.2 Protocol Stack for Vehicular Communications
Two mainstream stacks are still under development and optimisation These in-
clude the Dedicated Short Range Communication (DSRC) in the U.S [1] and C-
ITS in Europe [11]. Japan and China have proposed their own protocols for VCS,
but the research progress just focuses on the access technologies and both need
further development on the upper layers.
The protocol stack of DSRC is shown in Fig.2.1, the stack follows the basic
OSI 7-layer model. The radio access of DSRC is developed based on the IEEE
802.11 protocol series, which mainly describes the Physical (PHY) layer and Data
Link layer which includes the Medium Access Control - MAC, and Logical Link
Control (LLC) [1]. The wireless access standard IEEE 802.11a is modified and
optimised to fit the unique vehicular communication requirements and character-
istics. The amended version was temporarily called IEEE 802.11p from 2010 to
2012. The IEEE 802.11p [12] WiFi standard is commonly considered as the first
communication standard dedicated to the vehicular communication scenario [13].
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Figure 2.1: The US-based Dedicated Short Range Communication (DSRC) Pro-
tocol Stack
As an enhancement standard to IEEE 802.11 series, IEEE 802.11p has better sup-
port for ITS and VCS application requirements comparing to the previous mobile
wireless communication technologies. Finally IEEE published the IEEE 802.11-
2012 protocol standard which incorporated the IEEE 802.11p in its sixth amend-
ment in 2012 [11] [12]. The PHY and link layer standards for vehicular services
in IEEE802.11-2012 compose part of the IEEE standard for Wireless Access in
Vehicular Environments (WAVE) standard. In the U.S. WAVE refers to the radio
interface using the wireless access technologies to support vehicular communica-
tions in ITS [13]. Apart from the IEEE 802.11 series, other parts of WAVE are
built up with the IEEE 1609 standards and IEEE 802.2 standard. As shown in the
DSRC stack, the extension of MAC sub-layer is the IEEE 1609.4 standard. It is
responsible for the multi-channel operation of the access technologies [14]. The
standard enables the reception nodes in DSRC system to effectively switch among
different radio channels. The LLC sublayer act as a translation interface between
the upper network layer and MAC layer, the sublayer uses IEEE 802.2 [1].
The middle layers of DSRC protocol stack are divided into three parallel com-
ponents. One part is the traditional transport and network layer protocols, namely
TCP, UDP and IPv6. The traditional protocols are used to fulfill the basic com-
munication functions of the network, whereas the IEEE 1609.3 standard [15]
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takes the second part of the DSRC middle layer. WAVE Short Message Proto-
col (WSMP) is illustrated in IEEE 1609.3. IEEE 1609.3 defines the packet header
with minimum header length to reduce the packet overhead so that the efficiency
of vehicular single hop communication can be maximised. The protocol defines
the concept of communication packets using WSMP which is WAVE short mes-
sages (WSMs) and specifies the format of WSMs. The data of WSM is attached
to the payload field which is behind the WSMP header. The Basic Safety Mes-
sage (BSM) and WAVE Service Advertisement (WSA) are two important WSMs.
BSM is responsible for delivering vehicle state information to support safety ap-
plications and its format is defined in the SAE J2735 protocol (in the message
sublayer). The WSA stands for various DSRC services, including but not limited
to the traffic report, navigation, electronic charging [16] and entertainment, the
format of WSA is defined in IEEE 1609.3. The third component of the middle
layer stack focuses on security services which are specified in the IEEE 1609.2
[17]. The standard contains the details about the security services for ITS appli-
cations and management messages, including the optional encryption scheme and
specific authentication mechanism which are required to be deployed in BSMs
and WSAs.
As shown on the DSRC protocol stack, the message sublayer is located at
bottom of the application layer. Two protocols SAE J2735 [18] and J2945.1 [19]
from the Society of Automotive Engineers (SAE) International were chosen to de-
fine fifteen messages to support DSRC applications. Message formats, including
the BSM format, are defined in the SAE J2735 standard. The SAE J2945.1 limits
the minimum performance requirements of the BSM. One of the most important
requirements is the sending rate of the BSMs. Broadcasting BSM too frequently
leads to heavy network overheads and too fewer causes inaccurate traffic informa-
tion. Thus it is necessary to restrict the maximum and minimum bounds of the
BSM sending rate. The maximum rate of 10 Hz is restricted to meet the require-
ments above. Moreover, the message transmits power requirements are mentioned
in the protocol as well. Finally, the application on the top of the DSRC stack pro-
cess the safety and traffic efficiency applications, as well as other kinds of ITS
applications.
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In the Europe Union, the VCS protocol stack is called Cooperative Intelli-
gent Transport Systems (C-ITS) [11]. C-ITS is jointly developed by the European
Telecommunications Standards Institute (ETSI), the Committee for Standardiza-
tion (CEN) and the European Committee for Electrotechnical Standardization
(CENELEC). The first version has been released in 2015. In Europe, the idea of
ITS first appeared in the 1980s with lots of new ITS projects set up around 2000
with the development of electronic technologies. Finally the C-ITS was proposed
in 2010 and the first release was published in 2013 [11].
Figure 2.2: The Eu-based Cooperative Intelligent Transport Systems (C-ITS) Pro-
tocol Stack
The C-ITS protocol stack is demonstrated in Fig.2.2. The stack structure is
based on the ISO OSI 7-layer model and defined by ETSI EN 302 665 [20]. The
access technologies are concluded into ITS-G5 standards, including PHY, MAC
and MAC extensions layers, which is developed based on the IEEE 802.11. ITS-
G5 corresponds to the WAVE protocol set in U.S. WAVE and ITS-G5 using similar
frequency band at around 5GHz (G5 stands the 5GHz frequency band).
Like DSRC, the middle layer of C-ITS is still using traditional transport and
network layer protocols, which are, TCP, UDP and IPv6. The other part of the
middle layer is jointly composed of the Basic Transport Protocol (BTP) [21]
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and GeoNetworking [22], which are contained in standard series ETSI EN 302
636. Different from the DSRC, C-ITS specifies a dedicated routing protocol for
multi-hop vehicular communication called GeoNetworking. It helps to deliver
packets without passing through network infrastructures. The routing algorithm
in GeoNetworking decides the packet propagation route based on the positions
of nearby vehicles and its own position. Except for the traditional packet for-
warding methods (unicast, broadcast and anycast), two extra modes are defined in
GeoNetworking, namely, single-hop broadcast and topologically-scoped broad-
cast. Two most important messages in C-ITS, the Distributed Environmental No-
tification Message (DENM) [23] is distributed using Geo-broadcast and Cooper-
ative Awareness Message (CAM) [24] is broadcasted using single-hop broadcast.
BTP provides an end-to-end, connection-less transport layer service to support
ad-hoc communications. It offers a similar function to UDP, but it fits the ad-hoc
purposes of VCS. The overlapping part on the C-ITS stack between traditional
protocols and C-ITS protocols is the IPv6 over GeoNetworking (GN6) [25]. This
enables IPv6 packet to transmit via VCS using GeoNetworking. This approach
causes more complexity on the cooperation of protocols. However, it has better
flexibility for ITS applications.
Message functions and performance requirements are defined in the facilities
layer. The CAM is defined as the safety message to periodically send vehicle state
information. It informs nearby vehicles about traffic conditions to support safety
and traffic applications, having the functions like the BSM in DSRC. The DENM
is broadcasted by the safety applications whenever a safety-related situation hap-
pens. A more specific description about the safety messages is shown later in
Section.2.2.5.
Apart from the protocol stacks in U.S and Europe, Japan and China have de-
veloped their own access technologies for VCS which is because of radio man-
agement policy various in different regions. Japan proposed ARIB STD-T109
protocol in 2012 which was developed by Association of Radio Industries and
Businesses (ARIB).
Fig.2.3 is a brief graph of the ARIB STD-T109 protocol stack [26]. The
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Figure 2.3: The Japan-based Association of Radio Industries and Businesses
(ARIB) Standard No.T109 Protocol Stack
PHY layer of ARIB T109 standard operates wireless communication using mech-
anism based on the IEEE 802.11p protocol, but uses different centre frequency
(760MHz) with IEEE 802.11p. The upper layer until the application layer (Layer
7) follow the STD-T109 standard. MAC layer defines that the channel access
is maintained by both TDMA and CSMA/CA, which aims to support V2V in a
low latency and highly reliable manner. IVC-RVC refers to Inter-Vehicle Com-
munication and Roadside-to-Vehicle Communication, equivalent to V2V and V2I,
respectively. In the ARIB T109, the traffic of either IVC or RVC is processed indi-
vidually within their own control time cycles in order to suit the TDMA scheme.
Therefore the access control in MAC sublayer needs to be designed under the
IVC-RVC service information. The IVC-RVC integrated access control infor-
mation is created and managed at upper layers (network and transport layer) of
ARIB T-109 stack. The control information contains radio access parameters,
clock synchronisation information, packet species, etc. LLC sublayer is used to
offer connection-less service and further supports packet exchange between lower
and higher layers. Layer 7 plays the role of an interface between ITS applications
and lower layers, also responsible to security management [27].
The VCS protocol stack in China is still under development. The LTE-V2X or
LTE-Vehicle (LTE-V) is selected by the China Communications Standards Asso-
ciation (CCSA) to satisfy the plan of developing intelligent driver assistance and
automatic driving technologies, which is part of the national strategy of ’Made in
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China 2025’ [28]. Different the wifi-based standard IEEE802.11p, LTE-V based
on the LTE release 14 cellular network standards in 3GPP. From the side of net-
work performance, LTE-V aims to overcome the low reliability and high delay
comparing to IEEE 802.11p. On the side of industry field, LTE-V can use the
existing network infrastructures, instead of the new infrastructure investment in
IEEE 802.11p [13]. The drawbacks of IEEE 802.11p and the complete deploy-
ment of LTE network are the major reasons for China to select LTE-V standards.
The security features in LTE-V are specified in ETSI TS 133 185 [29]. Authentic-
ity, integrity, confidentiality and non-replay are required in the standard to protect
the transmission of data. For the application data, the security of LTE-V mainly
focuses on the safety-related broadcast messages. Recently, several big cities in
China are selected to test the performance of LTE-V and the approach is under re-
search by industrial companies in China, including Huawei and Datang Telecom
Group.
2.2.3 VCS Infrastructures and Components
Components in VCS can be classified into three parts, namely the mobile com-
munication devices, VCS infrastructures and the VCS authorities. The mobile
communication devices are the bottom of the network structure. VCS infrastruc-
tures are the basic framework of the VCS. The role of the network manager is
played by the VCS authorities which are located on the top of the architecture.
The mobile communication devices refer to the wireless communication mod-
ule that has the basic capability of receiving, processing, relaying and transmitting
VCS messages, the device is known as the On-Board Unit (OBU). Extra functions
are added into OBU in order to satisfy the requirements of ITS applications. The
applications contain from traffic management to commercial use cases. Naviga-
tion function is an important scenario for traffic management, OBU needs to have
satellite signal reception module to receive the satellite broadcast signal, also the
electronic maps are necessary to support navigation service. In fact, OBU is al-
ready equipped with some vehicles such as GPS modules in vehicle electronic
system. Another traffic management use case is the traffic report, OBU collects
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the nearby safety messages and generate the traffic conditions in front of the ve-
hicle based on the information inside the safety messages. Commercial use cases
include entertainment services, Internet access and advertisements.
The compulsory VCS infrastructure is the Road Side Unit (RSU), aiming to
fulfill the basic access point and relay functions between the VCS backbone net-
work and mobile nodes. In the IEEE 802.11p-based protocol stacks (DSRC, C-
ITS and ARIB T109), RSUs are supposed to be built along the road at regular
intervals to maintain acceptable coverage. In the system using LTE-V protocol
stack, the VCS network coverage is supported by the existing LTE base stations.
However, these LTE base stations are still called RSU since they responsible to
provide ITS access points for vehicles. Assumptions about RSU in some VCS
architectures are: RSUs have powerful computation ability to process the VCS
messages by themselves, and they have a direct connection to the VCS cloud net-
work which is composited by upper layer network managers and other RSUs [2]
[30]. For security purposes, Group Keys (GK) are distributed managed by RSUs
in VCS networks. Another important function of RSU is to bridge a route between
vehicles and upper layer authorities, allowing vehicles finish the registration or
certificate update step upon joining or switching VCS regions. Some other publi-
cations assume that RSUs equivalent to the network switch in the traditional net-
work, that means RSUs only have limited processing ability and heavy processing
tasks are accomplished by upper layer computation infrastructures. The authors
in paper [31] proposes a new infrastructure called Security Manager (SM). SM
is considered as an infrastructure with powerful computation ability which super-
vises multiple RSUs. SMs are connected to each other via secure cable to form
an SM-cloud network. Upper layer network authorities are linked to the cloud
network. The normal safety messages are still processed by RSUs, while the im-
portant messages (e.g. Rekeying messages or secret key handover messages) are
forwarded to SM by RSUs to be processed under highly secured algorithms.
VCS authorities are the top layer infrastructures to manage the running of
VCS, two aspects are concerned: VCS self-management and application man-
agement. VCS self-management involves the identity of communication nodes
within VCS, cryptographical materials of vehicles and communication perfor-
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mance of VCS. The identity and cryptographical materials are mainly managed
by the Public Key Infrastructure (PKI), the parent module of Certificate Authority
(CA) and Anonymity Server (AS). Generally speaking, PKI is normally man-
aged by governmental organisations which are in charge of the entire ITS and
VCS, such as the Department of Transport of each country. Some approach com-
bines PKI and CA as a single infrastructure called Central Manager (CM) [31].
The major security functions provided by PKI based on the cooperation with CA
and AS. These two infrastructures cooperate with each other to provide security
and privacy. The responsibility of CA is to generate certificates which provide
the authorised link between private/public key pairs and vehicle node identifier
[9]. To protect user privacy, AS generates pseudonyms (this includes pseudonym
identities and pseudonym key pairs) and pseudonym mapping which builds link
among real identities, pseudonyms and pseudonym certificates. AS also involves
the identity-hiding between VCS and third-party applications. Identity-related in-
formation sets (e.g. IP address, location information, MAC address and identity)
are removed from the messages before forwards messages to the third-party appli-
cation service providers [32]. Communication performance of VCS is monitored
and controlled by central monitor systems, such as Supervisory Control and Data
Acquisition (SCADA), which is maintained and operated by the network service
provider.
Application management schedules application messages between the third-
party application server and VCS. The job is finished by the third-party applica-
tion servers [32]. The third-party application servers are places outside the VCS
and under the management of the third-party service provider. Message traffic is
controlled by the service provider but not the VCS. VCS is only responsible to
hide the privacy-related information which is delivered by AS.
2.2.4 VCS Security Standards
In DSRC, security requirements for applications and management messages are
specified in IEEE 1609.2 standards [17]. The mechanism of operations for au-
thentication and encryption are defined in the standard, this is important for the
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development of security protocols and applications. In the standard document,
the Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm (ECDSA) as defined in the Fed-
eral Information Processing Standard (FITS) 186-4 is selected to be the signature
scheme to create the digital signature in security related messages. The hash al-
gorithm used for all the DSRC security purposes is SHA-256 as defined in the
FIPS 180-4. That means, all the hashed results are generated by processing the
original input into the SHA-256 algorithm. Encryption schemes are considered in
both asymmetric and symmetric schemes. The asymmetric scheme is used to en-
crypt symmetric keys so that secret GKs can be delivered in secure tunnels, while
the symmetric scheme is applied to encrypt data with the purpose of lightweight
and fast encryption. Elliptic Curve Integrated Encryption Scheme (ECIES) is pro-
posed as the public key encryption (asymmetric) algorithm in DSRC. Two differ-
ent curves (NIST P256 in FIPS 186-4 and brainpoolP256r1 in RFC 5639) are used
in DSRC to provide possible flexibility. The symmetric encryption scheme, Ad-
vanced Encryption Standard (AES) in Counter Mode with Cipher Block Chaining
Message Authentication Code (CCM) mode in NIST SP 800-38C is chosen to
encrypt data. The certificate is used the technology in [33] and [34].
Security-related standards in the EU based VCS stack are separated in dif-
ferent standards, each is responsible for different security functions. Basic Set
of Applications (BSA) are determined in ETSI TR 102 638, namely cooperative
road safety, cooperative traffic efficiency, cooperative local service and global in-
ternet services. Use cases and requirements are identifies based on these BSAs,
including safety-related cases (e.g. emergency warning, accident notifications,
collision warning and collision risk warning) [35] [11]. Brief requirement lists of
safety-related messages, advertised service messages and security in ITS applica-
tions are contained in ETSI TS 102 940 [36], as well as the security architecture.
ETSI standards TS 102 731 and TS 102 941 describes the structure of ITS au-
thority hierarchy, roles of security management authorities, PKI enrolment and
authorisation management protocols [37]. The standard also mentions the recom-
mended key management between VCS nodes, such as [38] and [39], but does
not give specific schemes. Message identity authentication for CAM and DENM
is described in TS 102 942. This protocol aims to prevent unauthorised access
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to ITS service [40]. Confidentiality services from lower layers to higher layers
are defined in ETSI TS 102 943 [41], the recommended application layer confi-
dentiality service uses the same encryption services in IEEE 1609.2 (AES-CCM
and ECIES). Header and certificate formats are defined in ETSI TS 103 097 [42].
This standard confirms the ECIES is used for the public key based cryptography
scheme and ECDSA is used to create the digital signatures. Like the IEEE 1609.2,
the AES keys are transmitted under Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC) encrypted
mode.
2.2.5 Important Messages in VCS
To achieve the basic function of ITS, it is vital to make sure the VCS can deliver
road situation information in time. Thus the safety-related messages are com-
monly considered as the most critical messages in VCS. The safety-related mes-
sages are concerned with the VCS protocol stacks. Standardisation organisations,
like ETSI, IEEE and SAE, produced various standards to define safety-related
messages in VCS.
The U.S-proposed DSRC defines the first type of safety-related message called
BSM. BSM is carried using WSM payload field which is defined in IEEE 1609.3
standard [15]. The protocol defines the concept of communication packets us-
ing WSMP which is WAVE short messages (WSMs) and specifies the format of
WSMs. The data of WSM is attached as the payload field after the WSMP header.
BSMs are supposed to report vehicle state information to offer safety-related ap-
plications enough data. Details about BSM in DSRC are listed in SAE protocols,
SAE has two important application layer message protocols which collaborate
with IEEE access technology standards to support DSRC: SAE J2735 and SAE
J2945.1 [18] [19]. SAE J2735 defines 15 data structures for different purposes,
including BSM, map data, safety requests and RSU alerts. The format of BSM is
defined in SAE J2735 [18]. The necessary data types are described in this proto-
col. The detailed data elements in BSM are shown in Table.2.1. The correctness
of these elements helps vehicles to decide proper driving routes which to some
extent guarantees the ITS safety. As the details in SAE 2735 are insufficient to
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support safety-related purposes, additional requirements of BSM are specified in
SAE 2945.1 [19] to help finalise the message format. Additional requirements
focus on the network performance and data trustworthiness. For instance, BSM
transmission power and BSM sending rate are the requirements to maintain ac-
ceptable network performance, while the trustworthiness can be achieved by using
security and privacy schemes and high sensor accuracy.
Time (UTC)
Message Count
Temporary ID
Vehicle Size
Position Information (Latitude, Longitude, Elevation)
Positional Accuracy Information
Speed
Heading
Steering Wheel Angle
Acceleration
Table 2.1: Data Elements in BSM
Apart from the BSM, another important type of WSM is the WSA which sup-
ports various services. Most of the WSAs are sent by RSU to carry VCS and
ITS services, from traffic services (e.g. Hazard alerts, navigation, accident notifi-
cations and congestion forecasting) to commercial services (e.g. Internet access,
charging or gas station positions, car park and entertainment) [1]. The vehicle also
has the ability to broadcast WSA, but the BSM is mainly sent by vehicles.
In the EU-based standard stack C-ITS, two safety-related messages are de-
fined by ETSI: CAMs [43] and DENMs [44]. Both message types use ITS Packet
Data Unit (PDU) header as message header to clarify message type and sender
address. Message content is attached to the ITS PDU header. CAM is a single-
hop safety message and has similar function with BSM: a vehicle periodically
broadcast CAMs to inform nearby vehicles about current vehicle status. Unlike
BSM carrying all vehicle status information, C-ITS divides vehicle status infor-
mation into three types and fills them into different containers. Three containers
are required in CAM to convey safety information, namely Basic container, High
frequency container and Low frequency container. Position and node type are
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written into the basic container as the basic node information. Data with frequent
changes (e.g. Speed, heading and wheel angle) are classified as high dynamic
data and written into high frequency container. Both the basic container and high
frequency container are mandatory fields in every CAM, due to the fact that in-
formation in these fields needs to be updated timely. Low frequency container is
an optional block in CAM to the large size or less time-critical information, such
as trajectory history and vehicle role [11]. Another optional field is the Special
vehicle container which is used to describe the special purpose vehicles, like road
works, escorting, ambulance and public transportation. The structure is demon-
strated in Fig.2.4. In EN 302 637-2, the upper and lower bounds of CAM sending
rate are defined as 10Hz and 1Hz, respectively.
Figure 2.4: The Format of Cooperative Awareness Message (CAM)
Figure 2.5: The Format of Distributed Environmental Notification Message
(DENM)
In C-ITS structure VCS, the hazard and accident notifications are not only
sent by RSUs, but via DENMs as well. DENM is managed by the safety-related
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applications. The message is triggered by accident events. Like CAM, DENM
inserts different functions into different containers, the structure is illustrated in
Fig.2.5. Event type, time of occurrence and event position are packed in the Man-
agement container. ITS PDU header and management container are mandatory
fields and rest containers are optional [44]. Optional containers carry extra event
information which further helps nearby vehicles to understand more details about
the event. All the information to identify event types uses pre-agreed identifiers
to accelerate message processing time.
AIRB STD T-109 only specifies general message format for IVC-RVC mes-
sages (including the PDU and payload elements) and Layer 7 application mes-
sages. Four services are carried by the Layer 7 messages. These include, mo-
bile station broadcast, base station broadcast, security primitive and non-security
primitive. Although the safety-related messages and accident notifications can be
achieved by adding relevant information to mobile station and base station broad-
cast messages, respectivelyïijNˇ but no further detailed rules are provided by the
technical standard documents [26].
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Chapter 3
Security in Vehicular
Communication System (VCS)
3.1 General Security Issues in VCS
3.1.1 Overview of Security Issues
General security issues are introduced here. Here the word ’security’ refers a
broader concept comparing to the concept of ’network security’, it contains both
secure message exchange and identity privacy. Along with the developments of
modern communication network, human life is high combined with the Internet
of Things (IoT) devices. Thus more and more network users start to pay attention
to the security and privacy of the network as these two aspects directly protect
the personal interests [45]. It’s necessary to address the security issues carefully
prior to the system design, otherwise, potential threats may happen [46]. Intelli-
gent Transportation System (ITS) and Vehicular Communication System (VCS)
are one of the most important use cases of IoT. ITS is a highly integrated system
that combines different cutting-edge techniques, such as wireless communication
networks, autonomous vehicles, advanced sensing technology and satellite navi-
gation system. VCS is the wireless communication platform that dedicates to the
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vehicular scenarios. Security of VCS prevents the unauthorised access to the in-
formation, while the privacy of VCS confuses the record of message ownership.
Security and privacy are correlation dependence and have benign collaboration.
The reliability of VCS is enhanced by the joint action of security and privacy. Due
to the description above, security and privacy issues are studied in the reminder of
this section.
Security Requirements
The foundation requirements for information security are shown in Fig.3.1. The
triangle presents the basic three elements of information security which is known
as Confidentiality-Integrity-Availability (CIA) Triad. The confidentiality element
means that only permitted user can access to information. Integrity guarantees
the accuracy and reliability of messages. Availability is the assurance that the
message can be delivered to authorised user properly.
Figure 3.1: The Confidentiality-Integrity-Availability (CIA) Triad
Confidentiality: Confidentiality can be achieved always achieved by encrypt-
ing the data into ciphertext. Cryptographic encryption is required to keep infor-
mation in secret status so that unauthorised user is not able to access and under-
stand. One of the commonly used metric to measure confidentiality is the length
of the ciphertext. Longer ciphertext always means better security level (because
it requires longer processing time for the receiver to decrypt the data) but longer
processing time, just the opposite for shorter ciphertext. Due to the limit on the
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network bandwidth resources, VCS aims at both security and efficiency. For this
reason, it is important to trade-off between these two aspects.
Integrity: Integrity means the information inside a message should be deliv-
ered under unmodified condition. Consistency, trustworthiness and accuracy of
information are critical for the safety messages within VCS because vehicles and
infrastructures use the safety messages to decide the driving routes and real-time
traffic conditions. An extra data block might include along with the sent messages,
such as Checksum or Message Authentication Code (MAC) block.
Availability: The information must remain available at all the time when users
require to access it. This purpose requires two aspects: communication network
and computing systems. On one hand, the security manager should bespoke a
message distribution scheme that not exceeds the capability of the communication
network. On another hand, the computing system aims to store and process the
secret data, as well as has backup plans to prevent hardware failures or attacks
such as DoS or DDoS attacks.
Besides of above general security requirements, some researchers also take
more extra elements into the basic principles of information security, such as au-
thentication, accountability and non-repudiation [47]. As a system that requires
high security level, VCS addresses more detailed demands.
Authenticity: The only way for reception node to trust a sender is to add a re-
ceipt in a message to show legality. To the nature of the wireless communication,
the man-in-the-middle attacks [48] [49] can be easily deployed. An adversary can
tamper, inject or delete messages, thus the receiver needs to guarantee that the
information is sent from a legal source within a large number of communication
nodes. Like the method to maintain integrity, MAC block can be used for au-
thentication purpose as well. Authentication receipts, such as digital certificates,
should contain information about the valid period of the transmitter. Addition-
ally, a novel method to achieve distributed authentication called blockchain [50],
is taken into consideration by lots of the researchers in the recent years.
Non-repudiation: Non-repudiation property in the security field always refers
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to the capability to guarantee that someone cannot deny something. In VCS, non-
repudiation refers to maintain the authorship between the sender and receiver of
the safety messages. Imprecise safety message causes seriously damage in VCS
and ITS environments. Hence, vehicles who send safety messages should not
be able to deny the fact that they transmitted the message. On the other hand,
non-repudiation also prevents a malicious user to challenge the authorship of a
message. This requirement is the basic condition to ensure accountability.
Forward/backward secrecy: In order to reduce the complexity of network
structure, communication overheads and broadcast management burden, VCS is
divided into several broadcasting groups, each is assembled by vehicles among the
same RSU coverage area. Membership list of each group changes dynamically,
hence GK must be updated and redistributed whenever membership changes to
provide forward and backward secrecy. Forward secrecy is a mechanism to pre-
vent the departing user from understanding future group broadcast, while back-
ward secrecy means that a fresh member can’t obtain information from previous
messages. The procedures to update and redistributed GK to the communication
participants are called rekeying.
Accountability: The major task of the security schemes is to prevent adver-
saries from compromising the guarded system. However the security schemes
should prepare solutions to recover the system after attacks happen. In wireless
communication, accountability refers to the mechanism that the real identity in-
formation can be accessed when a legal demand is proposed under designed rules
[51]. Network security manager first locks the malicious user within the network.
In the traditional network structure, the locking process needs cooperation be-
tween CA and PKI, whereas in the blockchain network, network managers only
need to check the public ledger which is maintained by the blockchain. Thus,
security managers are capable to map every security events to vehicle members.
Punishment is established in VCS to remove the identity and pseudonyms of ma-
licious from the legal user list.
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Privacy Requirements
With the increasing number of communication devices involving in the daily life,
the information privacy becomes a vital issue which is attracted lots of attention
by network end users. It is necessary to identify the privacy requirements before
starting design the network.
Anonymity: Anonymity focuses on the protection of the real identity of users.
On the user side, this feature is used to measure the ability of the user to access a
network service or information without disclosing its real identity. Users maintain
this by not releasing their user identity to third parties. On the side of network
observers (network infrastructures or attackers), anonymity provides a shield to
avoid exposing the user identities. Anonymity disables a set of users to see the
identity of someone performing certain actions. Hence, when the action of a user
is anonymous, other subjects will not be able to map the identity and user.
Pseudonymity: Pseudonymity is the derivative concept of anonymity, it ex-
tends the requirements of anonymity. Pseudonymity hides the user identity based
on the definition of anonymity, but still claims accountability function [52]. The
pseudonymity is classified as two kinds: reversible pseudonymity and nonre-
versible (or disposable) pseudonymity. Pseudonymity is required where the iden-
tity information of violators need to be revealed by law enforcement authorities
for liability purposes. Reversible pseudonymity means that a pseudonym can be
linked back to the real identity, this action is only processed by the authorities such
as CA. The non-reversible pseudonymity has a weak link between the pseudonym
and real identity, this is helpless to the accountability.
Short-Term linkability: The key factor to build ITS traffic map is the short-
term linkability [53]. In VCS, OBUs will frequently broadcast safety messages
including the speed, heading, location and vehicle size. Here assuming a vehicle
receives two or more safety messages within a short period of time, the vehicle
should be able to distinguish sources of the messages. Vehicles collect the nearby
safety messages to build up the current traffic map on the road. The privacy of
vehicles is not affected by the short-term linkability since the short time period
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does not cause long-term influence on the privacy [54]. To an extent, enforcing
short-term linkability prevents that a compromised user impersonates different
vehicles to launch the Sybil attack [55].
Long-Term Unlinkability: Unlike short-term linkability, the long-term link-
ability causes an enormous threat to the privacy of VCS. Therefore the oppo-
site property, long-term unlinkability, becomes a basic privacy requirement for
VCS. Long-term unlinkability reduces the change for an adversary to map multi-
ple messages to a specific user, this is because the fewer messages using the same
pseudonym, the lower chance to track a vehicle. Tracking protection must be im-
plemented to protect vehicles from matching of two or more successive positions.
3.1.2 Vulnerabilities and Challenges
A mobile node that runs a rogue vehicular communication protocol poses serious
threats. Incorrect safety messages threat the operation of VCS and ITS. Some
malicious users may send fake safety messages to clear the road in front for their
own benefits. More serious cases happen when criminals use fake safety messages
to create car accidents. It is vital to distinguish possible malicious attacks in VCS,
therefore researchers can concentrate their effort on weak points to enhance user
experience on both security and privacy. Even though lots of works have been
done in this area over several years, the complex characteristics of VCS make
it hard to provide a satisfying solution for security and privacy. Vulnerabilities,
as well as security and privacy challenges, are discussed in this section, open
questions about security and privacy are also included.
Vulnerabilities
Vulnerabilities [30] are shown in this section, including both vulnerabilities on
the security aspect and privacy aspect. Possible attack methods and solutions are
discussed as well:
Denial of Service (DoS): The Denial of Service (DoS) attack is considered as
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one of the most common attacks in communication networks. The attack aims to
unlink the network, further threats the availability of security system [30]. The
unblocked network is the basic requirement of ITS. However, threats like DoS
could cause serious damages even if DoS attack only contaminate VCS for a few
seconds. Because the security-related services require OBUs to process safety
messages as fast as possible. Traditional DoS attack is implemented by sending
a large volume of useless data packets in a short time interval to occupy almost
the entire network resources such as network bandwidth or memory storage space
[56]. Whereas in the wireless network, network designers also need to consider
the threat of battery volume and battery life causes by DoS attack [57]. Addition-
ally, the attack is difficult to eliminate completely as the network manager still
need to distinguish if the message is unnecessary or not [58]. For the above rea-
sons, VCS networks should be designed with satisfied robustness level to against
DoS attacks. However, it is impossible to completely eliminate threats coming
from DoS attack since the processing ability of the On-Board Unit (OBU) is not
unlimited. Thus VCS security architecture should be designed based on the trade-
off between OBU processing ability and network robustness.
Jamming: Adversaries generate interference (e.g. strong white noise) among
a small area. This attack prevents reception nodes inside the coverage area from
receiving useful messages. All the messages are classified into noise since the
noise power is too strong. the Vehicles suffer from this attack can’t extract safety
information from VCS. The jamming attack is a relatively easy way to achieve,
no need to study the knowledge about any group cryptographic mechanism. Even
though this type of attack is hard to avoid, it only implements and effects in a
small coverage area. A large number of attackers are needed if adversaries want
to interface large portion of the network. Some cutting-edge physical layer tech-
nologies are investigated to improve Signal to Noise Ratio (SNR) to eliminate
negative effect caused by strong background noise.
Forgery and Impersonation: Message forgery in cryptography uses the dif-
ferent definition of the literal meaning. It means the behaviour to confuse the real
message sender. Impersonation attack can be treated as a higher level of forgery
attack. This attack occurs when an attacker steals someone else’s identity by send-
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ing messages using the stolen identity [59].
The forgery attack harms the non-repudiation ability and accountability of the
security systems. A smart attacker might deploy forgery attack along with other
kinds of attacks. By threat the effectiveness of the non-repudiation and account-
ability, message forgery provides a barrier to prevent the network repairing by the
network manager. As an updated version of forgery attack, impersonation attack
is even more difficult to correct and recovery [60]. One straightforward harm of
this attack is about node priority. Priority issues are considered in ITS safety noti-
fications, ambulance, police cars, fire trucks and Special Purpose Vehicles (SPVs)
should send safety messages with higher priority so that they can save time on the
road. Moreover, the vehicle whose identity has been stolen will suffer from the
personal credit crisis, it could be revoked from the legal user list [60]. Adversaries
may masquerade as fake Road Side Unit (RSU) in some severe scenarios, which
counts the most dangerous attack. In this case, impersonation attack is accounted
a formidable way to mislead ITS environment. On the other hand, malicious users
may use fake identity and fabricate or alter false safety notifications, which makes
more difficult to track adversaries.
To prevent the above attacks, the non-repudiation schemes are considered as
the possible methods, such as digital signatures and certificates. They help to
reduce the probability of message using by illegal and unauthorised users. En-
cryption and access control are also included as double insurance. However, the
effectiveness of the above methods is reduced if attackers already join in the net-
work for a while [61].
In-transmit Tampering: The basic network type of VCS is ad-hoc network
and the safety messages reach far side vehicles via multi-hop communication. In
general, vehicle nodes act as a relay in ad-hoc network structure, moreover, RSU
and other network static infrastructures relay messages in some scenarios. The
potential vulnerability exists during the relay steps [62]. Falsified or modify the
original message is easy via this way and it’s hard to track since the source of
fake traffic notifications is different with attackers. By this reason, in-transmit
tampering attack shows more threat than impersonation and forgery attacks. To
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the nature of the operation mode of ITS, safety messages are the key feature to
maintain the accuracy of ITS traffic scheduling and safety applications. Thus,
the correctness and timely receipt of the safety messages are the cornerstone fac-
tor. Malicious users may generate safety messages with tampered hazard warning
thereby confusing road traffic. It is considered as a major threat scenario in ITS
security. Fewer threat attackers may send wrong traffic conditions to its own ben-
efits. Consider a situation that malicious users send fake safety messages to clear
the path in front of them, consequently avoiding congestion for his own benefits.
As we mentioned above, a malicious deploys in-transmit tampering attack
while it relays and broadcasts a safety message, then the tampered messages will
mislead many other vehicles because of the biased information inside [63]. How-
ever, the propagation method only causes negative effect under the condition that
the attacker is the only relay on the road. It is because other vehicles can de-
tect and correct the tampered information by matching and comparing the same
messages from the unhacked relays, as shown in Fig.3.2.
Figure 3.2: In-transmit Tampering Attack With or Without Neighbour Vehicle
MAC block is currently considered as a feasible solution to avoid In-transit
Tampering. With the help of MAC block, receptions can check the integrity of the
message, ignore messages with wrong MAC blocks. However, enormous damages
could be done if attacker broadcasting a large number of tampered duplications.
The OBUs would run out of processing resources under this kind of DoS attack.
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Moreover, the matching and comparing processes mentioned above need to con-
sume the processing power of OBUs, that means there still has the DoS attack
risk.
On-board Tampering: The in-transmit tampering attack and the above vul-
nerabilities are deployed during either transmit processes or reception steps, in
contrast, on-board tampering attack tampers safety message at the source. Similar
to the in-transmit tampering attack, they all broadcast false notifications, but on-
board tampering attack has the ability to forgery more safety-related information.
In this way, attackers don’t need waste time on deciphering nearby messages. In-
correct safety data (e.g. Location, vehicle types and speed) is created at adversary
OBU, rather than modifying VCS protocols and data inside collected messages.
This risk requires attacker acting as a legal user to be authenticated by PKI first,
and transfer into a malicious mode to apply attacks afterwards.
Every block in the fake safety messages is legal entities due to the fact that the
malicious user is assumed as a certificated member of the network. Certificate,
the Group Key (GK) as well as private/public key pairs are valid for the network
which makes the forgery notifications hard to be distinguished. The only way for
ITS to tell forgery warning is to collect nearby safety messages from other benign
users and summery the traffic information.
Additionally, in our point of view, the on-board tampering includes the hard-
ware tampering, although some research classified this as an individual vulnera-
bility [60]. The attack happens at the physically level, such as physically manip-
ulates the hardware security structure of the OBUs [64]. For example, tampering
the navigation component or the synchronised clock leads to the inaccurate posi-
tion, direction and speed information, potentially increases the accident probabil-
ity. Expect of physically damaging electronic components inside OBU, tampering
the electronic sensors on the vehicle also causes serious security risks.
Message Delay and Drop The delay attack refers to a scenario in which a
compromised vehicle will keep a safety message for a period, or just discard the
safety message. The drop-message attack likes the black hole attack. Black hole
attack causes routing problem on the upper layer of the communication proto-
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col stacks [65]. Therefore the drop attack leads to routing barrier, as well as the
propagation obstacle of the safety messages. This threats the information accu-
racy among safety applications as these applications are time-constrained. For
example, a delayed safety message shows the previous position of a vehicle. This
will confuse OBUs and cause more processing power to deal with it. However,
road traffic can be disturbed if a malicious user duplicates and broadcasts previous
accident messages (aka. Reply attack [65]).
Similar to the in-transmit tampering attack, message delay or drop only con-
fuses network if the attacker is the only relay vehicle. The delay attack can be
eliminated by adding timestamps into the safety message so that the receiver can
check the correctness of the message. In the urban area, the drop attack can be
prevented by hearing messages from other vehicles or infrastructures. Whereas
in the countryside or sub-urban area, message drop and delay cause much less
damage due to the low density of vehicle nodes. Moreover, to further increase the
security level, MAC block can be generated using the message information and
timestamps and attached inside the safety messages.
Eavesdropping and Privacy Violation: The eavesdropping attack in VCS
indicates the malicious behaviour to obtain the data inside the messages. The at-
tacker could be a compromised vehicle OBU or a fake RSU station. These attack-
ers locate in the middle of the communication route, this eavesdropping behaviour
also known as ’Man-in-the-Middle’. The eavesdropped information can be used
for two purposes: The first one threating the message security, malicious users try
to illegally access the encrypted data inside messages. Another aims to collect
privacy-related data, linking the similar data, tracking back to a specific identity
and further violating user privacy. To employ privacy violation attack, adversaries
need to collect other users’ privacy-related information first. Varies of messages
are sent periodically within VCS, control and safety messages include basic ve-
hicle information (e.g. vehicle type, location, speed) by default. Thus attackers
violate privacy by retrieving these default information inside periodic messages.
Powerful encryption schemes keep the information in the confidential data
stream. Privacy prevention technologies and encryption schemes can be used to
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decrease the affect causing the above attacks. The combination of both solutions
is used to enhance message security in VCS. Encryption forbids malicious access
to the readable data. The privacy prevention schemes help to hide the real identity
and make the behaviour of linking/tracking identity more difficult.
Challenges
Security and privacy challenges are demonstrated in this section. The challenges
are mainly caused by the unique characteristics in VCS. There are challenges in
the wireless sensor network and ad-hoc network, including but not limited to lack
of central manage, large number of mobile nodes and efficiency problems. As a
special use case of the above network models, VCS has unique characteristics and
the security framework should be designed based on these characteristics in the
proper way. These challenges are key objects for the key management research
work to overcome:
High Mobility: Due to the nature of VCS, node position between each other
changes rapidly. This results in the non-static node topology, causing the rout-
ing difficulties on the lower layer of the communication protocol stacks, while
the application layer pays more attention to the frequent member list changing.
Potential obstacles to manage secret personal keys and group broadcast keys are
aroused because the high driving speed of vehicles leading to dynamic change of
the member list. Vehicles pass each other gives very limit contact time length
to exchange safety information. In this case, connections between vehicles are
interrupted occasionally, this issue can be further optimised using multi-hop com-
munication technology to transmit information [62]. Apart from the above issue,
obvious negative effects happen a lot at non-urban areas such as on a countryside
highway. There is no way for infrastructures such as RSU to be equipped in dense
mode, in other words, blind zones exist in ITS. Therefore, vehicles on this route
only remain on RSU coverage for a limited period of time. On this account, VCS
network should be able to support long-lived identity authentication against short
time disconnection.
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Time Sensitive Applications: Time sensitive shows on two approaches, ITS
security mechanisms are highly relied on the safety messages with correct times-
tamps, what’s more, overhead and processing cost issue is a major problem for
VCS efficiency. ITS application takes timestamps, position and speed data into
calculation according to a specific mechanism, hence an incorrect timestamp is a
barrier for depicting traffic map. Major research topic in VCS is how to decide the
trade-off between network robustness and efficiency. On one hand, lightweight se-
curity protocols provide high efficiency, on the other hand, robust property against
DoS attack can’t be satisfied with short overhead cryptographic protocols.
Scalability: ITS is designed to implement in a broad area, including urban,
suburban and countryside areas. These areas have different traffic conditions,
large number of nodes flow rapidly every day in the urban area, much fewer cars
in the countryside and the traffic level in the sub-urban area is lower than that in
the urban area and higher than the countryside. The capacity of the group varies
among a large range. The origin of the above situations is the scalable problem.
The key of the scalability problem that influences security in VCS is twofold,
one is the methods to manage a large number of security-related materials, while
another one directs the amount of message flows within the VCS.
For the first aspect, a huge number of security materials of licensed vehicles
have to be issued by the security authorities (the Public Key Infrastructure, PKI or
Certificate Authority, CA). Moreover, these security materials are managed by dif-
ferent security agency under a unified transportation system, which poses a chal-
lenge to the certificate and secret key management system in PKI/CA. Whereas
the second aspect involves the usage efficiency of network resources. A large
number of vehicles flood huge amount of safety messages into VCS, consum-
ing network resources and infrastructure processing power. Thus, a number of
overheads must be limited, or compressed if possible. From the security point of
view, some previous contributions were proposed to decrease the rekeying cost by
developing advanced key management schemes [3] [66] [67].
Heterogeneity: Heterogeneity is still an open problem for most of commu-
nication network systems. The heterogeneity involves the management side and
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the protocol side. This thesis mainly concerns the management side. The main
issue is how to management the security-related and identity materials between
different network managers. Let’s assume the previous network manager is the
Home Agent (HA) and the next is the Foreign Agent (FA). On one hand, the FA
should forward the security and identity materials in the form of encrypted mes-
sages, keeping the materials unreadable by unauthorised units. On the other hand,
FA must verify the authentication receipt of the sender before processes the data
inside. Moreover, it is necessary for network managers to have a pre-negotiation
to discuss details about how to exchange information (e.g. Secret keys, mutual
passwords or the volume of the materials).
The protocol side considers that ITS wireless environment includes DSRC,
LTE-V, 3G, LTE and 5G. Heterogeneity is not only reflecting on network struc-
tures, but communication protocols as well. From the application layer side, the
widest gap of data between heterogeneous networks is that they may use different
cryptographic schemes. This can be solved by equipping various cryptographic
libraries to deal with various schemes. However, different protocols within lower
layers may use different control message formats and signal processing algorithms
(this may require distinct hardware facilities), therefore it’s hard to delivery se-
curity across heterogeneous networks. For clarity, we illustrate it with an ex-
ample, there are four global navigation satellite systems (GNSS) in the world:
Global Positioning System (GPS) for the US, GLObal NAvigation Satellite Sys-
tem (GLONASS) for Russia, Galileo for EU and BeiDou Navigation Satellite
System (COMPASS) for China. These GNSSs’ message with different position
data format and OBU receiver has to be able to receive satellite broadcasting and
understand coordinate information. Another problem is that if the preferred GNSS
disconnect, under what condition can a vehicle trust the others? and the OUB must
capable to use another one as back-up under an emergency situation.
Privacy Issues: Recently, citizens pay major attention to privacy issues. Fail-
ing to guarantee privacy in ITS could cause seriously vulnerabilities on security.
The aim of privacy shield is to block the link between messages and real vehi-
cle identity. Hence multiple certificates, temporary and permanent identities are
considered.
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3.1.3 Adversary Model
Security threats vary depending on the behaviour of network entities. Apart from
the vulnerabilities and challenges of VCS, it is vital to ascertain any possible ad-
versary methods in order to properly study and employ system defensive mech-
anisms. The designed VCS security scenarios should remain acceptable service
quality to against security threats. In view of large scale attack requires much
higher difficulty to achieve, It is reasonable to make two assumptions: Majority
of the adversaries are acted by individual malicious nodes or small node groups,
and the malicious stations only occupy limited (or relatively small) fraction of the
entire VCS-related stations [2]. Therefore the system should be examined under
various number of adversaries. Adversary models can be classified below:
Active/Passive Adversaries: Active and passive adversaries are distinguished
depending on the motive of attack. The active adversaries are able to modify,
delay, drop, replay, jam or forge messages during transmission [2]. Most of the
security related attacks are generated by active adversaries. On the other hand,
passive adversaries focus on privacy vulnerabilities. Malicious deploy privacy
attack by eavesdropping in-transit messages for future analysis. A typical type
of passive adversary is the man-in-the-middle attack. The attackers only hear the
messages within wireless network and can’t affect the behaviour of the sender and
receiver.
Internal/External Threats: Threats can be classified according to the way
they access VCS. Internal attackers are malicious who has authenticated crypto-
graphic receipts of network (e.g. Cryptographic keys, signature or Certificates),
either from official authorities or stealing from other legal entities. They have
the ability to participate into communications using VCS internal protocols. It is
difficult to detect when a legitimate user converts to malicious. Thus, the threat
causing by internal attacker rises the requirement of accountability function in
VCS. In contrast, external adversaries deal less damage to VCS since the network
is shielded by various protection mechanisms. However, DoS attack and collabo-
ration between internal and external still performance as serious open questions.
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Independently/Collude Attacks: Independent attackers arrange malicious
behaviours without collaboration between other attackers, while the collude at-
tacks distribute the attack procedures to different attackers, each is responsible for
part of the job. Cooperated attacks always result in a more serious damage to VCS
[2]. As said above, collude attack acts as a bridge between internal and external
threats. On the other angle, collude attacks can be local or global. The local attack
happens on a small sector, while global adversary happens in a large scale of the
region and causes larger problems.
Global/Local The global and local adversaries are decided depending on the
scale and range of an adversary. Global adversaries capable to access the entire
VCS, by either hacking into the central manager or deploying/corroding a large
number of nodes distributed within the network. This happens rarely since it
requires big effort to achieve the goal. Local adversaries only affect limited part of
the VCS. For instance, adversary node generates communication jamming among
a small section of VCS and causes traffic accident. This is considered as the
most possible adversary in VCS as it is easier to deploy compared to the global
adversary.
Static/Dynamic Static adversaries play a basic type of attacker: A fixed at-
tack method or strategy is selected before deploy attack. Even through the attack
generate limited influence to the VCS. For example, advanced signal processing
technologies prevent the VCS from an attacker that is set to only broadcast strong
white noise. However, dynamic adversaries know how to adapt the network sit-
uation by considering VCS configurations and technical parameters. The most
harmful attack mode is picked out by analysing the weakness of the current sys-
tem in order to maximise the negative effect of the attack.
3.1.4 Security Architecture
In this section, VCS architecture is illustrated on the angle of security, instead of
all its functions. The security architecture is organised based on the three-layer
VCS infrastructure framework. Different layers of security architecture in charge
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of the distinct VCS station groups. Large amount of security-related receipts are
generated, stored and managed on the top of the structure. This is achieved by
utilising seamless cooperation between two entities within PKI, namely, CA and
Anonymity Server (AS). Middle layer includes RSU and Security Manager (SM),
in charge of identity verification, secret key distribution and rekeying. For this
reason, mid layer holds major computation tasks in VCS. The third layer has large
number of mobile stations in VCS. Safety applications, vehicle status information
is collected, processed and sent by OBUs. In addition, OBUs frequently verify
the correctness of safety messages.
Top Layer Authorities
In PKI, CA and AS are centralised management facilities in VCS, they provide
security-related functions to cover the security requirements in VCS. Security and
privacy are two key aspects of overall VCS security. The privacy breaks the link
between information with a specific identity, preventing attacks to focus on a spe-
cific user intensively. Security prevents the data from accessing by unauthorised
entities. VCS security is maintained by using secret keys to transmit messages
and hiding real identities to assure unlinkability. CA mainly works for the secu-
rity part, while AS aims on the privacy prevention purposes. Symmetric cryptog-
raphy such as GK does not provide accountability function. Thus, it is necessary
to introduce asymmetric cryptography schemes to support better non-repudiation
function. For this reason, the use of PKI is a suitable way to achieve centralised
management of public/private key pairs.
Apart from the message confidentiality, nodes in VCS need to authenticate
their identities not only to infrastructures, but to other mobile nodes as well. This
requires the nonrepudiation property and it can be complied by using asymmetric
encryption schemes [30]. The VCS security architecture assumes that each vehi-
cle is issued two digital receipts (vehicle identification receipt and secret asym-
metry key pairs) before joining the ITS environment. PKI generates the above
receipts for the middle layer infrastructures. The identification receipt is a long-
term identity and asymmetry key pairs are used to secure identity verification. The
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receipts are sent to the CA for initial registration.
In the traditional security architecture, CA issues passport for each VCS nodes,
the passport is the certificate which contains the information to prove the owner-
ship of asymmetric key pairs. To meet the basic safety requirements in VCS,
registration steps in CA generate long-term certificate which matches the long-
term (or permanent) key pairs and node identities. Although the asymmetric keys
are not high frequent used in VCS, but they are the most important digital receipts
upon GK rekeying, node authentication and node handovers. The certificate is
demonstrated with every safety messages in order to show the message sender
is authenticated by an official authority [9]. Accountability function helps the
VCS to eliminate the post-attack damages. CA needs to revoke the certificate
of the attacker to deny the VCS accessing of the attacker. The revocation func-
tion is realised by compiling Certificate Revocation List (CRL) and checking the
CRL to verify the legality of users [2]. To satisfy privacy demand, vehicle nodes
are supposed to use pseudonyms, this contains the pseudonym identification and
pseudonym key pairs. In this case, CA also needs to generate the correspond-
ing pseudonym certificates to ensure that the pseudonym owner has authenticated
access to VCS.
AS has two interfaces to point internal demands and external applications. The
internal demands are pseudonym generating, mapping between long-term iden-
tity and pseudonyms and pseudonym resolution. The pseudonym is composed
of long-term identity and asymmetry (public/private) key pairs. Pseudonyms are
computed in AS, corresponding pseudonym certificates are generated by CA after-
wards. For privacy purposes, vehicles are forbidden to use real identity to commu-
nicate the pseudonyms and pseudonym certificates are only valid for a short period
of time. Therefore multiple pseudonyms are issued to one vehicle. AS maintains a
list to map between pseudonyms and real identities. Similar to the Domain Name
System (DNS), pseudonym resolution is compiled using the pseudonym mapping
list. The external demand is destination translation between external applications
and vehicles. AS relays external messages to the correct destination user, and
removes the vehicle real identity from the outbound messages.
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The collaboration within PKI is shown in Fig.3.3.
Figure 3.3: Collaboration Between Infrastructures In the Public Key Infrastructure
(PKI)
Middle Layer Static Infrastructures
The RSU is the only middle layer infrastructure in the traditional VCS structures.
Middle layer infrastructures are responsible to manage GKs and bridge messages
between upper authorities and vehicle nodes. This involves GK generating, GK
distributing, GK updating, safety message verification and attack detection. That
means RSUs are taken a large amount of computation work and powerful com-
putation module is required on every RSU. From the economical angle, it is not
realistic to equip a large amount of powerful computation units since RSUs are
supposed to be broadly deployed, especially if the VCS use IEEE 802.11p based
structure. To release the problem, SM is proposed in [31] to enhance security
level and release the computation burden. The approach concentrates the process-
ing module into SMs and lets SM to undertake majority computation tasks. The
RSUs play the role of Access Point (AP) with limited processing ability. More-
over, the VCS upgrade work will be easier if the future VCS network uses LTE-V
based protocols, since the future VCS only need to insert several SMs into the
current network.
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On-board Unit (OBU)
ITS vehicle hardware OBU should have interfaces to connect various ITS security
functions, otherwise the system doesn’t have enough immunity to prevent adver-
sary activities. Apart from the central processing units in OBU, security issues are
achieved by using two electronic modules in OBU: Event Data Recorder (EDR)
and Tamper-Proof Device (TPD) [30].
The responsibility of EDR is to record important data of vehicles, such as
navigation position, timestamps, speed and vehicle heading. These messages are
collected by EDR at regular intervals and several copies are generated to input
into safety applications. One copy along with the nearby vehicle status informa-
tion is forward to the processing unit on OBU to calculate the real-time traffic
condition, other copies are encapsulated into safety messages to report self-status.
Similar to the black box in an aeroplane, EDR is required to have enough mem-
ory storage to record all safety messages during emergency and critical events.
Data format should be compressed to save storage space. In addition, fast writing
speed is another critical target to cope with frequently digital information writing
and retrieving activities requiring by VCS applications.
Another device TPD is an essential electronic module which contains all the
cryptographic materials and operates cryptographic and authentication actions.
TPDs possess with multiple encryption schemes, therefore OBU can sign, ver-
ify, encrypt and decrypt based on these schemes. Signature is checked by TPD
when safety and application messages are received by OBU, the encrypted safety-
related data is decrypted using symmetric scheme in TPD afterwards to extract
safety-related data. Cyphertext and digital signature are generated in TPD before
the vehicle attempts to send messages. or under the premise that ITS security
based on the information of cryptographic algorithms, TPD is the most important
part in OBU, however, the security requirements can be extended to guaranteeing
TPD independent from the external environment. For this reason, independent
battery support and precisely self-owned clock are prerequisite components for
TPD. Some approach proposes to have a Hardware Security Module (HSM) in
OBU [2]. This module is a physically isolated module to store private keys and
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process all the private key related operations. This aims to provide physical pro-
tection of security.
3.1.5 Cryptographic Schemes
Message security schemes are cryptographic and authentication techniques to pro-
tect integrity and secrecy. Encryption schemes support the cryptographic func-
tions, authentication schemes assure the message integrity and non-repudiation.
Digital certificates offer trustworthy receipts to tie the link between encryption
schemes and authentication schemes.
Message Authentication Code (MAC)
Secrecy does not imply authenticity or integrity, in many cases, receivers like to
ensure that their messages are not modified during transmission. MAC block is
an information block which is used to authenticate a piece of message to support
information correctness. The result of MAC block is computed from the origi-
nal input data and secret key, the output is normally named with ’authentication
tag’. A common used MAC algorithm is Hash-based MAC (HMAC) [68] which
imports the input data and secret key into one-way Hash functions (Using Hash
function SHA-256 in SHA-2 family is believed as a reasonable choice [9]) and
outputs a unique MAC block. It is attached to the original message to provide
further authentication and integrity functions.
MAC block is generated and verified using the same secret key. This indicates
a symmetric key must be agreed by both sender and receiver. For this reason,
MAC scheme is perfect to provide authentication among a broadcasting group.
However, the main shortcoming of MAC is that non-repudiation function is not
offered, since MAC can be generated by any user who capable to verify it with
secret key. With the help of MAC, Adversary can’t generate correct MAC for the
forgery message even if it can understand the ciphertext. In addition, less OBU
processing time is used if the reception side verifies MAC block first and discards
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the message with incorrect MAC.
As defined in IEEE 1609.2, MAC type in ECIES should be MAC1, a subtype
of HMAC [69]. The MAC scheme in AES-CCM is selected as CCM-MAC. MAC
is constructed from a chain of cipher blocks. Due to the fact that both encryption
schemes have default authentication code block, there is no need to add extra
MAC block behind the messages to provide authentication.
Encryption Schemes
Both asymmetric and symmetric cryptographic schemes are involved in VCS to
assure authentication and confidentiality. To make sure vehicle sends trusted
safety messages, a combination of symmetric and asymmetric cryptography al-
gorithms is decided in both DSRC and C-ITS protocol stacks. They propose to
use asymmetric keys to encrypt keys and symmetric keys to encrypt data. The
asymmetric schemes use the public key to encrypt while private key to decrypt,
normally with higher reliability but longer processing time. What’s more, asym-
metric algorithms require pre-agreement certificate to show the ownership of the
public/private key pairs between key holder and CA. The vehicle connects CA
to show the registration demand and CA returns the authenticated digital certifi-
cate after validates the legality of the vehicle. The public key has open access to
the network and the vehicle holds the private key in a physically isolated mod-
ule in OBU. Thus, encryption scheme with better security is needed. Symmetric
schemes use the same key for both encryption and decryption, less calculation
time is required, but with relatively weak security level.
The asymmetric scheme is used to secure symmetric keys or pseudonyms dur-
ing rekeying or pseudonym exchange, respectively. It always combines with the
digital signature to show the legality. Rekey messages infrequently happen in
VCS comparing to other types of message, but it is well understood that key sets
inside rekeying messages are a prerequisite for security service. Hence rekeying
messages must be encrypted with a higher security level encryption algorithm.
Similar to the rekeying messages, pseudonyms from AS are supposed to access
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by specific users. It is necessary to encrypt pseudonyms with a specific user’s
public key. For the above reasons, asymmetric algorithms are needed to prevent
secret keys from stealing by other users. The only asymmetry encryption scheme
in IEEE 1609.2 is the ECIES based on IEEE Std 1363a. The main purpose of
ECIES is to encrypt symmetry keys [17]. ECIES bases on Elliptic Curve Cryp-
tography (ECC) [70] [71]. In VCS based ECIES, the Key Derivation Function
2 (KDF2) is used as the Key Derivation Function (KDF) to calculate symmetry
key and MAC key, MAC block uses MAC1 algorithm and all the hash functions
use SHA 256. The use of both encryption and MAC code aims to provide con-
fidentiality and authentication. The plaintext is first encrypted into ciphertext by
symmetry encryption scheme in ECIES, a MAC block is generated based on the
ciphertext and attached to the ciphertext. Finally the ECIES ciphertext is finalised
by linking the cryptogram which is consisted of public key, symmetry encrypted
ciphertext and MAC block [72] [69].
Data in safety messages is sent after encrypted to achieve security purpose.
All the safety messages are shared among vehicle group which contains vehicles
within same RSU coverage area. This requires using GK to encrypt message data
to prevent the data access by users outside the group. GK is designed to share
among all authenticated members. Consider the numerous number of safety mes-
sages, symmetric keys are used to encrypt data due to short encryption processing
time. Therefore, to balance the trade-off between processing speed and security
level, group key should be symmetric key and the symmetric algorithm is perfect
to encrypt safety messages. Symmetric algorithm with less security vulnerabili-
ties is decided to use for encrypting data in safety messages: AES [73] in counter
mode with CBC-MAC mode [74], also known as the AES-CCM mode in NIST
SP 800-38C [75] [76], is a desirable choice for group secret key in VCS [17]. Like
ECIES, AES scheme uses a counter with CBC-MAC mode to offer both authenti-
cation and confidentiality [77]. The outputs of AES-CCM encryption are cipher-
text and MAC block. Encryption uses counter mode to encrypt plaintext blocks
separately and combine encrypted blocks into ciphertext. The MAC block, also
called an authentication tag, is generated in two versions. One is generated uses
the final ciphertext, while another one is computed based on the first encrypted
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block [78]. All the above blocks are counted into the final output of AES-CCM,
the output length is the sum of MAC length and input payload length.
Digital Signature
Both digital signature and MAC block provide the authenticity of messages. Be-
cause of the signature must be generated by a specific user and verify by using
cryptographic material from the specific user, the message sender can’t deny the
sender behaviour (non-repudiation) and the receiver knows that the sender is a
legal user. But the digital signature is different from MAC as signature using
asymmetric keys to process generating and verification steps. A digital signature
is created using node private key and verified by using the public key.
IEEE 1609.2 [17] purposed to use ECDSA [79] specified in FIPS 186-4 to sign
messages in VCS. Like ECIES, it bases on ECC technique and uses public/private
key pairs and uses SHA-256 for all the hash functions. Both the ECC schemes
in VCS follow the key pair generation algorithms in FIPS 186-4 [17], and key
pair validity is checked with steps in IEEE Std 1363-2000 [80]. The key length
was carefully considered for the signature scheme in VCS, since the digital signa-
ture scheme is executed whenever a message needs to send. Generally speaking,
ECDSA can be encrypted using keys with either 256 bit or 224 bit. However,
maximum 80% extra processing time is cost if signing or verifying with 256-bit
key but not 224 bit key [1]. Taking message volume in VCS into consideration,
network efficiency benefits a lot form a shorter key. Therefore 224-bit ECDSA
key is agreed to sign BSMs in VCS.
Certificate
Part of the security purposes is achieved with the help of private/public key pairs.
A certificate is a digital passport that allows a vehicle to exchange information
securely over VCS using key pairs agreed by PKI. The certificate is generated in
CA to confirm the vehicle owning the key pairs. Key pairs are agreed between
PKI and vehicle user first, the agreement of keys is sent to CA for certificate
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generation afterwards. Apart from the information to show the relationship with
key pairs, the certificate also provides the certificate also provides the legality
validation information of a vehicle to clarify the permitted time period of network
access. It is the most important digital receipt that can prove personal identity
to VCS central manager and other VCS participants. VCS messages, including
safety messages, are valid in VCS only if the sender attaches legal certificate block
behind the message main body. The certificates are authenticated with CA private
key which can be verified by all members with CA public key. The structure of
certificate contents is demonstrated in Table.3.1.
1st Field Public key used to verify digital signatures
2nd Field Identifier of the issuer (CA)
3rd Field Permission associated with that public key
4th Field Link between the public key and permission
5th Field Revocation info
Table 3.1: Certificate Format
IEEE 1609.2 specifies the function of each field [17]. The public key is associ-
ated with the private key, which is held by the certificate holder [1]. The public key
is stored in the certificate for message receivers to verify the signature, no need
to pre-distribute the public key. The issuer identifier indicates the identity of CA,
as the certificate is issued by CA. Permission involves various aspects, namely
geographic, validity time, application and authority. Geographic and validity time
permissions are the validity geographical region to use this certificate and the legal
time period to use the certificate, respectively. Application permission contains a
Provider Service Identifiers (PSIDs) to specify the overall application scenarios.
This shows the list of service messages that this certificate is allowed to use. Sev-
eral Service Specific Permissions (SSPs) are contained in the PSID to distinguish
the valid services of applications. Vehicles need to be distributed the new version
of SSP if it requests new applications. Authority permission decided if the certifi-
cate holder can issue or generate a certificate. The fourth field expresses in two
forms, namely explicit and implicit certificates. It depends on if the certificate
contains the full version of the digital linkage. The linkage is the public key of
vehicle and it is obtained by either directly taking from certificate or deriving from
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the CA certificate and reconstruction value in the certificate. Revocation informa-
tion illustrates the revocation conditions of this certificate. The receiver uses data
in revocation component to check if the certificate is valid or not. To achieve this
purpose, various parameters are involved such as legality active time period and
permitted travel range.
To support the privacy requirements, each user will be assigned with multi of
certificates, each corresponding to a distinct pseudonym. Therefore long-term and
short-term certificates are introduced to support real identification and pseudonym.
The long-term certificate is checked whenever vehicle switches to a region under
managed by another CA or SM. Each short-time certificate will be used for a short
period of time and revoked after that.
Message Format & Verification
To ensure security, both encryption and authentication are necessary components.
The safety messages and rekeying messages take part in maintaining safety in
VCS. The safety messages are designed to include three basic components, which
are ciphertext block, digital signature and certificate. These blocks are located
in sequence to constitute safety message. For clarity, the typical safety message
format is presented with an example:
Figure 3.4: The Format Of Safety Messages
As shown in Fig.3.4, the Payload field includes vehicle state information and
extended safety information. The vehicle state information offers speed, vehi-
cle identity, position and size, etc, whereas the extended information provides
event history, trajectory map and predicted path, etc. the Ciphertext field in the
safety message refers to the encrypted payload result using AES-CCM encryption
scheme
47
CipherAES = AES(Msg,KeyAES)
Rekeying messages are sent by infrastructures (mainly refers to RSUs) and
convey the updated GK. Thus the encrypted GK block, signature and certificate
of the infrastructure. Different from the data encrypted by symmetry keys, asym-
metry encryption scheme is used if a message carries either the symmetry keys.
This mainly appears in the rekeying messages. The updated GK is encrypted into
a block using the public key if the central manager needs to send a new GK to a
dedicated user. In this case, ECIES ciphertext is generated to secure the original
message. Signature and certificate are used to provide authenticity and declare
the node permissions, respectively. The brief structure of the rekeying message is
shown below:
Figure 3.5: Format Of Rekeying Messages
As mentioned in previous sections, both symmetry and asymmetry schemes
offer authentication function which is realised by MAC block. MAC block in en-
cryption schemes uses the name of the authentication tag. It is generated based
on the encrypted message to meet higher efficiency purpose. In this way, there is
no need to decrypt the ciphertext if MAC is incorrect. As specified in the encryp-
tion schemes, MAC blocks are designed to be verified at the first space after the
message is received. To sum up, the format of MAC block should be:
MAC = MAC(Ciphertext,KeyMAC)
Other authentication blocks are placed behind the ciphertext. Authentication
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block group is composed of digital signature and certificate. They both contribute
to improve the non-repudiation and trustworthiness of the message. The signature
is generated using the private key of the sender. The certificate contains the public
key to verify the signature, as well as evidence to show the validity of the certifi-
cate. The VCS system assumes all the nodes are equipping with the public key
of CA. VCS network using Ad-hoc based structure, nodes in VCS are required
to check if a message is correct before relay it to other nodes. Correct signature
implies that the message is sent by an authenticated user itself, while a valid cer-
tificate proves that transmitter remains as a legality member among current VCS
broadcasting group. The receiver checks the validity of the certificate at the first
place. Signature is verified using the sender’s public key in the certificate. Finally,
the ciphertext is decrypted to obtain safety information if the message is a safety
message, safety parameters are sent to ITS software applications on the ITS appli-
cation layer afterwards. New GK is decrypted from the ciphertext and substituted
the previous one if the message is a rekeying message. A brief structure of digital
signature and certificate are illustrated as follows:
Sig(Signature Content)Keypriv
Cert Content+SigCA+Keypub
3.1.6 Privacy Prevention Technologies
Information privacy becomes a critical issue in VCS with the development of ap-
plications in VCS, such as safety messages and vehicle navigation services. In
order to prevent the privacy information from abuse, information senders usually
hide the privacy-related information in the messages, such as location, node iden-
tity and source network address [81]. Some approaches assure privacy level by
restricting the information accessibility. Authors in [82] describe a framework to
allow a message sender to limit the accuracy of location data, as well as to control
the delivery rate through the pre-agreed restriction policy. An alternative approach
in [83] describes a method to control information access by checking certificates.
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The third-party service must display the valid certificate before getting the permis-
sion to retrieve the privacy-related information. Apart from the above approaches,
a commonly used approach to protect privacy is that the vehicles broadcast mes-
sages using pseudonym and frequently change their pseudonyms. The pseudonym
changing means that the vehicle needs to change all the identifier information
from physical layer to application layer. A more detailed discussion about various
privacy prevention methods is displayed below.
k-anonymity: In the VCS, the ’quasi-identifiers’ information (e.g. vehi-
cle size, speed, direction and the list of subscribed services) always can be re-
identify individuals by combining, matching and analysing information from suc-
cessive messages or by looking at unique characteristics found in the released data
[81][84]. K-anonymity is illustrated in [81] to further reduce the probability of re-
identify. K-anonymity is achieved when the messages from the user are mixed
with other messages. For instance, a specific use case of K-anonymity within
VCS is that the exact locations of the vehicle are merged with the cloaked region
where covers at least k users.
Mix zone: The mix zone [85] model assumes a trusted system, located be-
tween the real OBU location data and the third-party message receptions. It is
designed as a geographic region within the ITS environment. All the vehicles
within the region are required to change their pseudonym at the same time, as
well as not to broadcast safety messages or application messages with the previous
pseudonym. These vehicles are marked as ’mixed’ because any privacy-related in-
formation can’t be observed from outside. Generally speaking, the mix zone must
be selected carefully to maximise the privacy level. For example, a traffic junction
will help a lot to mix the privacy-related messages by containing a large number of
vehicles from various directions. Additionally, pseudonym changing is supposed
to happen within the mix zone to enhance privacy. Therefore the long-term move-
ments of vehicles are untraceable after vehicles depart the mix zone. As shown in
3.6, vehicles a-e join the mix zone and leave the area with new pseudonyms v-z.
Mix zone hides the mapping between these two sets of pseudonyms.
Authors in [86] analysis the effectiveness of pseudonym changing inside mix
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Figure 3.6: A Crossroads Max Zone Example
zone. Authors simulated the probability of a successful attack with respect to
the size of the attacker monitor coverage. The results show the mix zone meet the
privacy requirements if an attacker monitors less than half of the mix zones within
the network.
A cryptographic-based mix zone scheme called CMIX is described in [87].
Mix zones are formed using cryptographic schemes at intersections within the
coverage area of RSUs. RSU distributes a symmetric key to the vehicles inside
the RSU’s mix zone. The key is delivered when vehicle joins and register with the
RSU region. All the messages are encrypted using the pre-agreed symmetric key
within the CMIX mix zone. The malicious users are difficult to link the identity of
a single vehicle because all the messages in the mix zone use the same encryption
key.
Changing pseudonym at social spots is discussed in [88] and [89]. The social
spots are mix zones with unpredicted position and further reduce the chance to be
monitored by the malicious users. Vehicles decide the position of mix zone ac-
cording to the real-time conditions, for example, a group of vehicle may choose to
change their pseudonym at the same time when they are at roundabout or intersec-
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tions. In this case, the social spot becomes a temporary mix zone. The schemes
show that the high node density prevents the adversaries from tracking the real
identities [88] [89]. However, a drawback of these schemes is that they provide
insufficient privacy level for low node density circumstances.
Silent Period: The silent period is defined as a short period of time to change
pseudonyms [90]. Authors in [90] analysis that the mix zone is useful to protect
the privacy information from the application provider. It is because the third-
party applications threats privacy by eavesdropping the identity-based information
from a message. However malicious user normally eavesdroppers a period time
of communication [90]. For instance, powerful attackers are capable to track the
position of the vehicle by measuring the signal strength. The safety messages are
sent continuously and the message sent from the same vehicle have very similar
signal strength. To solve the problem, all the vehicles within the silent period are
forbidden to broadcast safety messages or reply the application-related messages.
Neither the previous pseudonym nor the next pseudonym is allowed to broadcast
within the silent period. The conclusion in [90] proves that the silent period with
both constant and variable time length provides better privacy level.
Paper [91] proposes a scheme to keep vehicle remaining silent after changing
its pseudonym. Vulnerabilities associated with attached geographical features can
be used by adversaries to accumulate location history of vehicles over time. The
paper proposes a scheme (AMOEBA) to enhance location privacy on a group ba-
sis. Variable silent period length is used to achieve unlinkability between the vehi-
cle identity and vehicle location. They consider a scenario where a vehicle broad-
casts safety messages frequently. This vehicle remains silent and changes its pre-
vious pseudonym, then broadcast the safety messages using the new pseudonym.
A similar scheme called CARAVAN using silent mode with pseudonym chang-
ing as well [92]. Authors try to unlink the tracking vulnerability through safety
message broadcasting. Attack models (simple and correlation tracking) to match
two possible locations of a vehicle are described along with the solution scheme.
CARAVAN combines an enhanced silent period technique with group naviga-
tion. The group navigation creates a mix zone to break the link between the
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pseudonyms and the location-related applications. Vehicles within a certain ra-
dius form a group and a group leader is selected. When an application request
is received by the group member, this request is forwarded and processed by the
group leader and replied using the group leader’s location information [92].
A dedicated pseudonym changing scheme in VANETs is discussed in [93].
The silent mode based on the mobility of the vehicles is examined to get the in-
fluence of mobility of the vehicles on pseudonym changes. The turn on/off of
the silent mode is dynamically decided by adjusting the mobility of the surround-
ing vehicles. Node interaction and quiet time are two factors which influence the
efficiency of location privacy. In order to meet the purpose of a certain level of
privacy, the paper illustrates that an optimal interval of pseudonym changing must
be adapted to the node interaction interval. Another approach using silent period
is proposed in [94]. The SLOW protocol forms the silent mode without an infras-
tructure or cooperation from nearby vehicles. The protocol requires the vehicle
remaining silent (stop transmit messages) when the speed of the vehicle below a
pre-agreed threshold. The length of the silent period is defined to make sure that
the vehicle can finish pseudonym changing. Mix zone technique is considered in
the SLOW protocol to maximise the uncertainties about the identities. Addition-
ally, SLOW protocol reduces the computation level of verifying digital signature
under high vehicle density.
Pseudonym Swapping: Pseudonym changing approaches aim to protect in-
formation privacy of the broadcasted safety messages. However, simply changing
the pseudonym still exists several weaknesses. Pseudonym changing schemes
have limit improvements with respect to the privacy [92]. More importantly,
the feasibility of large number of pseudonyms is hard to satisfy in real vehicu-
lar communication networks. Each pseudonym is supported by the correspond-
ing pseudonym certificate and asymmetric key pairs to assure complete privacy.
These materials require high processing power to generate and large storage space
to store. It’s a heavy burden for the network manager to generate multiple numbers
of pseudonyms and distribute them to vehicles. Alternatively, vulnerabilities ap-
pear during the pseudonym renewing procedures if this happens frequently [95].
Thus, the renewable pseudonym becomes a possible method to solve the above
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problems. However, it’s a risk for a vehicle to reuse a set of pseudonym that is
used before. For this reason, the possible solution is swapping pseudonyms with
other vehicles[95].
In order to meet acceptable privacy level in the limited-bandwidth network
and release the network manager’s computational load, [95] proposed a time-
slotted pseudonym pools for pseudonym swapping. The scheme assumes each
vehicle has a pseudonym pool and pre-agreed time-slot length, a new pseudonym
is picked from the pseudonym pool to use whenever a new time-slot starts. Ve-
hicle decides whether to exchange pseudonym with another vehicle depends on
the speeds, headings and positions information. A threshold of similarity of ve-
hicle movement status is discussed as well. To further improve unlinkability, this
approach proposes to swap pseudonym candidates among pseudonym pool be-
fore they actually using them. Authors in [95] propose an enhanced scheme us-
ing pseudonym swapping in [96]. The scheme called SlowSwap is introduced in
this extension work to manage pseudonym over low-bandwidth networks and pro-
vide privacy assurance for all vehicles in ITS environments. Comparing to their
previous paper, this paper discusses more performance comparisons between the
proposed scheme and the benchmark using silent periods.
A larger scale of pseudonym swapping scheme is illustrated in [97], the swap-
ping is achieved using a distributed algorithm for shuffling pseudonyms among
participated vehicles. This work describes a complete pseudonym framework
including pseudonyms within multiple layers, such as MAC addresses and IP
addresses. RSUs play a critical role in the privacy framework and pseudonym
shuffling since RSUs have larger storage capacity and processing power compar-
ing to the OBUs. Authors use RSUs to shuffle the pseudonyms sets instead of
requiring vehicles to find similar movement partners. In the scheme, an RSU col-
lects the current using pseudonyms within their coverage area and distributes the
pseudonyms into the RSU network, also receives the same number of pseudonyms
from the network. The simulation results demonstrate the feasibility of this scheme
to manage a large number of pseudonyms, as well as prove the pseudonym shuf-
fling scheme generating acceptable communication overhead.
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3.2 Key Management Schemes
VCS security is supported by the broadcasting of safety messages. To ensure all
the safety messages are not abused by malicious users, safety-related informa-
tion in the safety messages must be understood by authenticated group users only.
For this reason, the problem of providing VCS security can be mapped into the
problem of sharing secret key within all the group members, under the assump-
tion that the group has a large volume of mobility nodes and frequently changed
membership list.
The key management schemes can be classified into two types depending
on the source to generate the root secret key and the branch keys, the types are
the Top-Down and Bottom-Up, respectively [98]. Top-Down key management
schemes generate GK and logical keys at central manage facility and distribute
these keys to nodes at lower tree branches. The Logical Key Hierarchy (LKH) [3]
[99] is the most famous and common used basic structure for Top-Down meth-
ods. In LKH, the central key manager selects Key Encryption Keys (KEKs) and
Tree Encryption Key (TEK) independently [3]. Where KEK occupies the key tree
logical branches and it’s used to encrypt the upper level KEKs in the tree logical
nodes. The TEK is placed at the root of the key tree, which acts as GK.
On the other hand, Bottom-Up key management schemes such as One-Way
Function Tree (OFT), user nodes and logical branch nodes are all equipped with
two cryptographic materials: node secret and node keys. Central manager in OFT
only needs to broadcast two functions. These functions are used to compute node
secrets from child nodes and generate node keys from its node secret, respectively
[98]. OFT schemes usually using Hash Function [68] to achieve better security
level, the combination data string is entered into the hash function to get new keys.
Another bottom-up scheme is One-Way Key Derivation (OKD) [100], similar to
OFT, OKD uses hash function to calculate secret keys but with higher confiden-
tiality degree.
A shared symmetry secret key is selected among all authorised members to
ensure secure group communication, this referring to the GK. Due to the fact
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of dynamic group membership in VCS environment, GK must to be refreshed
and redistributed to every member of the communication group to achieve for-
ward and backward security [3]. However, large number mobile nodes lead to
very frequently individual joining and leaving requests if send rekeying messages
corresponding each joining and leaving requests. In this case, the conventional
individual rekeying is extremely inefficient, as the network resources are con-
sumed during preparation procedures of huge amount of rekeying message which
is caused by frequent member changing [67] [101]. Specifically speaking, the
main goal of key management schemes is to decrease the number of rekeying
messages, also known as the rekeying overhead or rekeying cost. To release the
above problem, batch rekeying is proposed as an effective method to solve the
problem. Batch rekeying method collects joining and leaving requests for a pe-
riod of time and rekeying the group at the end of this period of time. Efficiency
can be improved significantly by applying this scheme.
3.2.1 Key Tree Approach & LKH
In VCS, a GK is distributed to each group communication participants to avoid
important information from eavesdropping by malicious users. Hence the central
key manager and VCS mobile nodes form a tree with the central key manager
on the root of the tree and mobile nodes at end of the tree twigs. A traditional
key tree in Fig.3.7 displays terrible performance when there has a large volume of
vehicle nodes. The structure of traditional key tree requires a large number of in-
dividual rekeying messages to complete secret key update. Therefore Group Key
Management (GKM) scheme should be designed to meet scalable and efficiency
requirements.
Key tree approach or LKH structure [3] [99] is one of the most protruding
GKM structures. According to the previous descriptions, GK is placed at the root
of the tree and user nodes are separated at the termination of branches. Logical
key tree bifurcation points are introduced into the key tree approach with cor-
responding secret keys on them. The most significant advantage of LKH is the
scalability: For a d−degree LKH tree with N nodes, the communication overhead
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Figure 3.7: Traditional Key Tree
for each group rekeying is d logd N, whereas for the traditional key tree structure
in Fig.3.7, overall rekeying cost of N is needed under same conditions. Therefore
the overhead of LKH decreases logarithmically but not linearly.
Figure 3.8: A Typical Structure Of The Key Tree Approach
An example of LKH rekeying is shown as follows, Fig.3.8 presents a binary
LKH tree. Binary indicates the degree of the key tree which means two branches
are separated at each logical node on the key tree. The binary LKH tree structure
gives the highest efficiency which is due to the fact that higher tree degrees form
the traditional key tree structure at the bottom layer of the key tree. This causes
additional rekeying procedures to the individual nodes. The key tree branches
have three layers, the first layer separates eight users into two groups with four
users, the second layer separates four users into two double-size group and finally
the third layer branches distribute nodes to dedicated branches. If there is a mem-
bership changing in the position of the first user U1, then a rekeying message is
sent by the central key manager to update GK and KEKs for all users with the
following blocks:
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1. For users in positions U5 to U8, they locate at the different first layer tree
branch with U1, hence only need to update TEK (GK) for them. New group
secret key T EKnew is encrypted by logical key KEK1. First block in rekey-
ing message is:
Block1 = AES(T EKnew,KEK1)
2. Users U3 and U4 share one logical key KEK0 with changed user U1, but not
lower layer logical key KEK01. For this reason, KEK0 is updated to a new
version KEK(0,new). KEK(0,new) is encrypted by KEK01 afterwards. Finally
new TEK is encrypted using KEK(0,new). To sum up, the second block has
two components:
Block2.1 = AES(KEK(0,new),KEK01)
Block2.2 = AES(T EKnew,KEK(0,new))
3. All keys are updated for users in position U1 and U2. On this account, the
updated logical key KEK(00,new) is encrypted by the public key of U1 and
U2, respectively. The rest process similar to the above steps. Final part of
rekeying message has three components:
Block3.1 = ECIES(KEK(00,new),key
U1
pub)
Block3.2 = ECIES(KEK(00,new),key
U2
pub)
Block3.3 = AES(KEK(0,new),KEK(00,new))
To further reduce overhead, all blocks are combined into a single rekeying
message. Block1 to Block3.3 are queued in sequence, instead of broadcasting mul-
tiple rekeying messages.
3.2.2 OFT & OKT
With the help of one way functions, especially the hash functions, OFT and OKD
schemes significantly decrease the overhead when broadcasts rekeying messages.
The top level GK is calculated by iteration calculation of lower layer node secrets
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and node keys. In OFT, each node has a node secret which equivalents to the
KEKs and TES in LKH. The node secret is a piece of digital receipt that can be
used to calculate the logical node key of the upper layer. The node secret key is
derived from its node secret in a bottom-up style [98]. Two hash-based functions
are required to store by each node in order to calculate new version cryptographic
materials, named the f function and the g function. Node secret key is generated
by substituting the node secret into function g and function f is used to calculate
part of the node secret of upper level node.
Fig.3.9 presents a typical OFT or OKD key tree, the structure is very similar
to LKH tree. According to the OFT scheme in [98], the secret key of node N1 is
calculated by k1 = g(x1), here k1 and x1 are the node key and node secret, respec-
tively. The node secret of upper level node N1−3 is computed using information
from all its children nodes: x1−3 = f (x1)⊕ f (x2)⊕ f (x3), where the symbol ⊕
is the bitwise exclusive-or [98]. Similar to lower layer nodes, the secret key of
higher level node N1−3 is calculated by k1−3 = g(x1−3). Upon rekeying process,
the central key manager needs to distribute all the node secrets which need to be
changed. According to the mechanism of OFT, a node n have to share its node
secret xn with all the sub-group members in order to make sure that every partici-
pant can generate their upper level logical key. However, privacy issue in VCS is
hard to employ with OFT because a node must use multiple sets of keys to ensure
privacy. In addition, potential security vulnerabilities appear if a malicious node
acts as a fake identity by using these node secrets.
Key update follows a smarter way in OKD, each member in broadcast group
only need to store a hash function in order to calculate the key in next stage. As-
sume the key tree in Fig.3.9 is an OKD key tree. If the sub-group key k1−3 of
logical node N1−3 need to be updated, then the new sub-group key is calculated
by k
′
1−3 = f (kr ⊕ k1−3), here kr is randomly selected secret key from the child
nodes of N1, N2 and N3, and f (x) is the hash function. In this way, the central
manager send the rekeying message with a ’self-update instruction’ and encrypt-
ing k
′
1−3 by k2 and k3, respectively. Where the ’self-update instruction’ is sent to
the node with key kr [100]. According to the algorithm difference between OFT
and OKD, OKD produces less rekeying blocks than OFT [102]. In addition, OKD
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Figure 3.9: The Typical Structure Of One-Way Function Tree (OFT) Or One-Way
Key Derivation (OKD) Key Tree
members don’t need to share themselves node secret with others which provides
better confidentiality.
OFT and OKD do not suit for ITS scenario since they require some nodes to
the self-calculate key after receiving the rekeying message. This causes an extra
delay which decreases the system efficiency. On the other hand, hash function
needs to be regularly replaced, potential safety threats may happen during the
process of hash function distribution.
3.2.3 Batch Rekeying
Although the previously described key management schemes are contributed a lot
to reduce the rekeying overhead and efficiency, it is still an inefficient method to
execute rekeying procedures for every joining and departure action. The batch
rekeying scheme is proposed in [66] to further decrease the rekeying overhead.
This scheme is considered the first GKM scheme using batch rekeying conception
to manage a large number of rekeying messages. In this approach, all the rekeying
messages within a certain period of time are combined into a single rekeying mes-
sage to batch rekey the previous GKs. Four rekeying situations are distinguished
to fit every possible occasion. The batch rekeying scheme assumes there are J
vehicles joining the group and L vehicles leaving, respectively.
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Case 1
If J = L, new joining users replace the previous key tree end twigs of leaving
users, the leaving users are removed from the key tree.
Case 2
If J < L, joining members fill into J minimum depth tree end twig vacancies
of the departing users, the leaving users are removed from the key tree.
Case 3
If J > L and L = 0, first find the shallowest nodes on the key tree and remove
them. The selected nodes and joining users build up several new subtrees
and attach to the deleted points afterwards.
Case 4
If J > L and L > 0, execute steps in case 2 first, and then operate algorithm
in case 3.
As an initial scheme using BR, this algorithm still has some space to enhance
based on the VCS scenarios, for example, probability factor can be involved in
both joining member ordering and insert point selection steps.
3.3 Heterogeneous Key Management
Different networks have different features in heterogeneity. Unique characteris-
tics in ITS introduce various heterogeneities into communication systems. The
large coverage area of ITS leads to various node densities, different mobility lev-
els, multiple PKI infrastructures. Heterogeneities in node densities and mobility
levels require the network to process key management schemes under security do-
mains which have a different number of mobile nodes. This introduces scalability
and efficient requirement to the key management scheme. Moreover, different PKI
infrastructures cause heterogeneity on different network authorities which require
smooth coordination between authorities. With the fast development of IoT sce-
narios in the recently years, heterogeneous networks are considered as a critical
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topic in key management field. However, it’s hard to develop a general key man-
agement to suit the above heterogeneities as different heterogeneities require their
dedicated key management schemes. Different network node numbers are taken
into research at the first place. The situation happens frequently if a network cov-
ers both urban and rural areas. Paper [103] and [104] purpose a topology-based
key tree structure in order to match the physical position of nodes. Based on this
idea, a topology-based tree generation algorithm is introduced in [104] to release
the negative effect of network heterogeneity in a different number of participants.
This idea is further developed in [105] to employ it into VCS scenarios. Hetero-
geneity in communication capacities is considered in [106]. The authors discuss
several methods to manage wireless sensor nodes with different transmission ca-
pabilities. In this paper, base stations and wireless sensor nodes are treated as
heterogeneous features with different data processing, storage and bandwidth ca-
pabilities. A dedicated key management scheme is designed for this situation. An
enhanced development of idea in [106] is presented in paper [107]. This paper
discusses that homogeneous (Or flat structure) limits the scalability of the net-
work. A hierarchical heterogeneous wireless sensor network is defined according
to node functions in this paper. A hybrid cryptography scheme is introduced into
the different layer of node: Nodes with higher processing ability use heavyweight
but more safety cryptography scheme and simple sensor node use more flexible
encryption scheme. Paper [108] classifies VCS areas with different average speed
into heterogeneous blocks. It is because speed difference leads to an uneven den-
sity of vehicles.
3.3.1 Handover Authentication
The wireless network allows nodes to move freely without the restriction of wire
connection. However, the new network needs to verify the identity and validate
of the joining user to assure security. The aim of handover in the wireless mo-
bile network is to enable mobile nodes to seamlessly roam from previous APs to
another one. Handover authentication appears to become a new barrier because
of the unavoidable authentication processing time upon network shift. As shown
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Figure 3.10: The Conventional Mobile Node Handover Process
in Fig.3.10, the handover procedures involve the collaboration between five en-
tities: Mobile Nodes (MN), Home Agent (HA), Foreign Agent (FA), Authenti-
cation Server. The authentication server locates at the top level of the network
and responsible for the management, issuance and initialisation of cryptographic
materials, such as asymmetric key pairs, certificate and pseudonym sets. MNs
consist of the bottom layer of the network. It plays the role of network users
who are willing to access the network services. The middle layer contains APs
of the network, namely, HA and FA. The MN current registers with HA, while a
handover happens when the MN roams into the coverage area of FA.
The MN demands network access within the entire network and it has network
connection via the current AP, also known as HA. No mutual trust relationship is
established between MN and any non-HA APs, this means that the MN can’t trust
the information from any non-HA servers without verifying, and vice versa. The
current connection is achieved after successfully authenticated with HA. Com-
pulsory authentication steps are required if MN wants to enable network access
outside the coverage area of HA. At the same time, FA using cryptography-based
messages to prove its identity and legality. Thus the handover starts with the MN
joining and ends with the completion of authentication.
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Identity and legality are checked during the authentication steps. The iden-
tity is checked by verifying the signature, which can be linked to the current
pseudonym of MN. Legality is shown in the specific field inside the certificate.
The field is dedicated to indicate the legality valid period of the MN.
3.3.2 Message Handover Handshake Procedures
The advanced cross domains message handover handshake steps are discussed in
[109] [110] to guarantee efficiency and security. The handover steps were studied
under mobile multi-server networks. The existing message handover schemes
assume that all the MN had registered with the authentication server to obtain
the cryptographic materials before joining the network. The MN sends a request
message to sign into FA upon joining the foreign domain. The request aims to
achieve mutual trust between MN and the new domain manager FA. FA receives
and verifies the request for security purposes. Researchers in [109] [110] classify
the existing protocols into two structures according to the number of message
handover participants: three-party and two-party approaches.
Figure 3.11: The Conventional Three-party Message Handover Handshake Pro-
cedures
Earlier approaches [111] [112] demand three entities to finish the message
handover procedures. Fig.3.11 demonstrates the general three-party message han-
dover procedures. The message handover is triggered by MN itself, starting with
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a message handover request. In wireless communication networks, the message
handover is received by the base station, verified and forwarded to FA afterwards.
Before building a connection with MN, FA must send an authentication request in
order to authenticate the unfamiliar node through HA. HA first verify the identity
of FA upon receiving the authentication request. After the above steps, crypto-
graphic materials from MN are checked by HA. Two handshakes will be estab-
lished between FA and HA before MU is proved as a legal user in HA. FA will
issue a new set of cryptographic materials to MU as the message handover reply
after FA received the authentication reply from HA. MN processes the message
handover reply, not only for retrieving the cryptographic materials, but also check-
ing the identity and legality of FA.
Typical procedures of three-party message handover schemes are described
in [111] [112]. Three communication phases are divided into the schemes: Initial
phase, cross authentication phase and key updating phase. In the initial phase, MN
is expected to register to the authentication server along with its real/permanent
identity IDMN over a secure channel. A timestamp ts is attached at the end of the
message block.
MN→ Authentication Server : IDMN , ts
Then the authentication server prepares permanent secret key pairs KMN :
(PKMN ,SKMN) and permanent certificateCertMN . The authentication server sends
back the above cryptographic materials in the end. Alternatively, some schemes
assume that MN receives secret key pairs and certificate before it joins the net-
work. General message handshakes are shown below, including the typical mes-
sage format.
Authentication Server→MN : KMN , CertMN
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Then, MN needs to register to HA with its real identity, signature and cer-
tificate in order to get permission to use the network service in HA domain.
The authentication server the register reply, HA replies back a certain number of
pseudonyms PIDMN : {pid1,pid2...pidn}, corresponding pseudonym asymmetric
key pairs:
pKMN : {(pPK1,pSK1)...(pPKn,pSKn)}
and the corresponding pseudonym certificates pCertMN : pCert1...pCertn.
MN→HA : Msgreg = Sig(IDMN ||ts)SKMN +CertMN
HA→MN : PIDMN :, pKMN , pCertMN
The cross authentication phase contains the verification between FA and HA.
Figure 3.12: The Conventional Two-party Message Handover Handshake Proce-
dures
The interactions between the HA and FA cause authentication delay. HA is
required to acquire authentication information of an MN from the FA at a far
distance. With this in mind, researchers developed the two-party approaches
to improve the efficiency. HA is completely eliminated from the message han-
dover handshake. Fig.3.12 briefly illustrates the handshake steps in the two-party
schemes. Node handover can be finished only between MN and FA in the two-
party scheme. After the handover, FA sends a handover result to inform the HA
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to revoke the registration of MN.
3.3.3 Message Handover in VCS
The earlier version of the message handover authentication schemes is based on
the mobile phone networks or general Wireless Sensor Networks (WSNs). Mobile
nodes in these scenarios have unpredictable trajectories, therefore the mobile node
triggers the message handover authentication. A message handover authentication
request should be sent to FA when the mobile node is driven into a new security
domain. FA then forward the handover request to the corresponding HA. HA
returns the response to the request to FA, FA executes the cryptographic materials
(secret keys, temporary certificate, etc.) to distribute to the mobile node. While
in VCS, the trajectories are easily predicted by taking mobile direction, speed and
position into account. Here we assume the Security Manager A (SM-A) plays the
role of HA and SM-B acts as FA. In VCS, SM-A knows the vehicle is about to
join the coverage area of SM-B according to the driving direction, speed, position
and all the cryptographic materials. Thus SM-A informs SM-B about the message
handover action in order to let SM-B update keys to the vehicle. To sum up, the
handover schemes in the conventional mobile network in [111] [112] [109] [110]
needs a round trip (between three entities or two entities) to finish, while only a
one-way communication is needed in VCS.
3.4 Distributed Ledger Technology (DLT)
The Distributed Ledger Technology (DLT), or shared ledger introduces a syn-
chronised, distributed and shared data ledger which is maintained by all the nodes
within the peer-to-peer (P2P) network. The way to manage the ledger is in dis-
tributed mode, that means, every node can manage the public ledger but the mod-
ifications must be accepted by all the other nodes. Two characteristics, distributed
and decentralised, are always mentioned along with DLT. The distributed char-
acteristic indicates the angle of network structure. Distributed network structure
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follows the mesh or P2P topologies without a central manager to route the mes-
sages. Decentralisation mainly refers to the management mode of DLT network.
Generally speaking, the core principle in DLT is decentralisation. The centralised
network depends on a network manager to decide network behaviours, such as
routing messages and preventing malicious behaviours. As a result, centralised
managers take heavy communication traffic and computation burden. Further-
more, the whole network suffers from disconnection if the central manager is un-
der attack. Decentralisation management networks, on the other hand, distribute
the responsibility and control permissions between the user nodes. Security and
privacy of the network are based on the proof-of-work [113]. Due to the nature
of distributed computation, the network has better robustness to against network
failure caused by nodes disconnection. Although the 51% attack [113] still plays
a potential problem for blockchain applications, holding a majority of the total
network’s processing power is highly unlikely. It’s uneconomic for individual at-
tackers to employ a powerful system like ITS. Paper [114] precisely analysed the
security threats to blockchain system.
As one of the most famous DLT use cases, the blockchain concept has been
attracted a lot of attention since its first parent production, bitcoin, was launched
in late 2008 [50]. The core idea of blockchain in Bitcoin applications is that it
maintains a distributed and synchronised ledger of digital currency transactions.
Without the administration from the central manager, network nodes denote their
processing power to proofread transactions. The authenticated transactions are
combined and written into the public ledger in the form of blocks. It is convenient
to look-up the block ledger to track the node behaviour history and further ben-
efits the accountability function, which helps to timely revoke the cryptographic
materials of malicious users to avoid additional security threats. Another issue of
blockchain approach is the use of transactions which conveys information among
the distributed network and can hence send messages using P2P mode [115]. More
importantly, network participants (miners) contribute their processing power to
verify information correctness and integrity in blockchain network [115].
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3.4.1 DLT Applications
Most of the contributions using blockchain are devoted to optimise decentralised
currency models. Authors in [116] presented a new cryptocurrency. Based on the
concept of bitcoin, the new cryptocurrency improves scalability and flexibility of
cryptocurrencies.
Despite the fact that there is no other work about using blockchain in VCS,
blockchain architectures in some contributions are still valuable for reference. Pa-
per [117] proposed to use blockchain to build a decentralised system to manage
personal data. Authors design two types of un-financial transactions which are
assumed to access data in blockchain and write data into the ledger, respectively.
The access control of personal data is monitored by blockchain. An access trans-
action is sent when a user tries to access the database for storage or retrieval of
data. After the access transaction is approved, the user needs to describe their
requirements in data transaction in order to finish the communication between
blockchain. However, authors in [117] didn’t consider overhead and efficiency
problems.
Since IoT aims to seamlessly fit into CPS, for maximising adoption by users
and infrastructures. It is critical to compress the overhead and efficiently manage
the increasing number of node identity materials [118]. The authors in [119] focus
on a cutting-edge secure transaction exchange system using blockchain for decen-
tralised energy trading in another CPS, smart grids. They address the scalability,
security and privacy problems of the centralised system. The security issues are
analysed with reference to the processing time to different cryptographic schemes.
However the analysis is not based on the network performance. Contribution in
[119] involves another blockchain-CPS research focusing on smart medical sys-
tems. Wireless nodes and sensors play the role of blockchain miners. Miners in
this approach can get access to anonymised medical data as rewards, in return for
their mining work to maintain the blockchain. Both patients and the health care
staffs are given accessible and credible electronic medical records.
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3.5 Simulation Tools
Simulation tools are important helpers to assist researchers. New algorithms and
protocols are allowed to be implemented in the simulation software to generate
initial stage results, without costing money to build real testbed. A proper simu-
lator helps researchers to create a virtual ITS communication model and tests any
affects causing by different parameters. Researchers in VCS field usually use both
network and traffic simulator. Commonly used network simulators are Network
Simulator 3 (NS-3) [120] and OMNeT++ [121]. They are both open source soft-
ware, based on C++ language and includes sufficient network packages for both
wired and wireless networks. In OMNeT++, an Eclipse-based IDE is included to
use, whereas in NS-3, it has to be imported into other IDE such as Eclipse. Traffic
simulators are used to simulate node mobility. SUMO [122], TranSim [123] and
VanetMobiSim [124] are widely used. SUMO can integrate with OMNeT++ and
import road map for real city with detailed information of road and building size.
In addition, Vehicles in Network Simulation (Veins) [125] project is a powerful
library for OMNeT++.
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Chapter 4
Probability-based Key Management
for VCS
In this chapter, the optimised novel Group Key Management (GKM) is presented
to minimise the rekeying cost. Rekeying cost refers to the number of messages
that are generated to finish one rekeying process to all the nodes. Specifically
speaking, a detailed description of key initialisation and probability-related batch
rekeying is presented. This is achieved by introducing vehicle leaving probability
into GKM to construct a more efficient key tree. The probability-based key man-
agement scheme first implements the reliable connection among vehicles, Road
Side Units (RSU) and Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) to finish key initialisation.
With this in mind, vehicles must register themselves with CA before they start
using Vehicular Communication System (VCS) applications. Moreover, key tree
efficiency highly depends on whether users with similar leaving probabilities are
located within a small sector in key tree [126]. Due to the nature of VCS, the cen-
tral manager knows the speed and position of every node in its coverage area,
therefore Leaving Probability (LP) and Leaving Ratio (LR) can be calculated
based on this data. The scheme uses the typical VCS structure with RSUs and
SMs filling the middle layer. The RSUs act as APs and SMs process the secu-
rity messages which requires large computation ability. Central managers (PKI,
CA) occupy the top layer of the network to centrally manage the cryptographic
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materials. The overview structure is shown in Fig.4.1
Figure 4.1: The Traditional Vehicular Communication System (VCS) Network
Structure
4.1 Joining Handshake
Cryptographic encryption schemes, digital signature and certificates are intro-
duced to jointly provide security in VCS [17]. Public/Private Key pairs and cer-
tificates are managed by PKI. IEEE1609.2 [17] defines the use Elliptic Curve
Integrated Encryption Scheme (ECIES) as asymmetry encryption scheme and
Advanced Encryption Standard in Counter Mode with Cipher Block Chaining
Message Authentication Code (AES-CCM) as the symmetry encryption scheme.
ECIES requires larger proportion of processing resources and it is used to se-
cure Group Keys (GKs) when the key manager needs to rekey individually [127].
AES-CCM secret key is selected as the GK for group communication, which is
considered as a lightweight symmetrical encryption algorithm.
In the scheme, all vehicles are assumed to hold either permanent or temporary
certificates in order to complete joining handshake work. A temporary certificate
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Figure 4.2: The Joining Handshake Procedures For Initial Registration
is assigned before vehicle leaves the manufacturer. The temporary certificate is a
digital contract between vehicle manufacturer and ITS manager, aiming to prove
the legality of the manufacturer. As shown in Fig.4.2, new vehicle needs to use
it to send an Initial Registration Message (IRM) for self-registration at initial par-
ticipation in VCS environment. Vehicle who sends IRM messages without record
about GK. The IRM uses similar structure with the safety messages, but the ve-
hicle state information is substituted by the Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC)
asymmetry public key which is generated by the vehicle itself. The key pairs
and other vehicle information are decrypted using the AES-CCM key which is
pre-agreed between manufacturer and PKI. The structure is shown in Fig.4.3. The
IRM is collected by RSUs and forwarded to SM to finish security checking. Cryp-
tographic materials and vehicle certificate are sent to PKI to request the official
certificate. In the end, the certificate and GK is sent back to vehicle so that vehicle
can legally access to VCS environment.
Figure 4.3: The Format Of The Initial Registration Message
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Permanent certificates are attached to the messages to prove user validation.
When a vehicle attempts to move into a new security domain area which is un-
der the administration of the same PKI, it keeps broadcasting safety messages
using current GK. Here assumes that both previous and SM can receive the safety
message through the road side AP (RSUs). During the joining handshake pro-
cedures, the permanent certificate is checked by current SM whenever a vehicle
approaches the border between current and next SM administration areas which
are under the same PKI security domain. The RSU catches the safety message
which is sent from the departure vehicle. The message follows the routine mes-
sage processing procedures. The certificate is checked first to make sure the valid
identity of the vehicle, the digital signature is verified using Elliptic Curve Digi-
tal Signature Algorithm (ECDSA) algorithm for authenticity and non-repudiation
purposes afterwards. The safety-related information is decrypted using the AES-
CCM keys. The relevant information is forwarded to the next SM if the safety
message indicates a vehicle departing action. In this case, the next SM obtains
the region changing information from the message which comes from its neigh-
bour SM. The legality of the vehicle’s identity is verified by the next SM and the
rekeying broadcast is sent until the start of next batch interval. Fig.4.4 illustrates
the above procedures.
Figure 4.4: The Handshake Procedures For Switching To Another Security Do-
main
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4.2 Leaving Probability
Definition of LP of the mobile node is introduced in [126] as an average number
of nodes leaving the group within a rekeying interval. For traditional mobile net-
works, such as WSN and LTE network, entrance and departure actions of portable
nodes are unpredictable. Hence some key management schemes require nodes
subscribing several rekeying intervals in order to calculate leaving probability.
Unfortunately, security vulnerabilities appear when the system allows users to se-
lect their own subscription period: a malicious user eavesdrops critical messages
by asking active period longer than its real residence time.
Different from general wireless mobile networks, probability models are much
easier to implement for vehicle nodes in VCS since they usually have predictable
moving trajectory. For this reason, a dedicated LP calculation algorithm can be
developed for VCS scenarios. According to the traffic survey [128] at a one-
directional urban road, speed distribution fits normal distribution function below
[129]:
f (x|µ,σ) = 1
σ
√
2pi
e
(x−µ)2
2σ2 (4.1)
Here, µ is the mean or expectation of the normal distribution and σ is the stan-
dard deviation. With the help of the speed distribution and vehicle specifications,
the key managers in VCS are able to compute the Possible Speed Range (PSR) and
the Possible Departure Speed Range (PDSR). The upper boundary UPSR stands
for the maximum speed in which vehicle can reach at end of current batch interval
(tBR) of Batch Rekeying (BR). Similar to UPSR, LPSR is for the minimum speed
if vehicle tries to slow down. In addition, UPSDR and LPSDR are the highest and
lowest speed for a car to leave the current RSU coverage, respectively. We assume
that dremain is the distance between vehicle current position and coverage border
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which is directly ahead of the vehicle. Thus, the LP PL is calculated as expressed:
PL =
∫UPSDR
LPSDR f (x|µ,σ)dx∫UPSR
LPSR f (x|µ,σ)dx
(4.2)
The SM knows the maximum positive and negative acceleration data of ve-
hicle by listening to the vehicle status information inside the safety messages,
thus it is easier to calculate the upper and lower boundary (Vmax&Vmin) of PSR.
For PSDR boundaries, Vdep−max stands for the maximum speed for the vehicle to
depart, two different extreme situations are classified in Fig.4.5:
Figure 4.5: Max Departure Speed Range (a) The First Departure Situation (b) The
Second Situation
1. As shown in Fig.4.5(a), vehicle keep speed-up with maximum positive ac-
celeration a+ until the speed reaches Vmax. Keep the speed until end of batch
interval. Overall distance dremain is covered by the vehicle (shadow area on
graph).
2. Fig.4.5(b) demonstrates that the vehicle already has enough speed and dremain
is short enough so that vehicle is able to leave the region easily. Hence it
speed-up with an acceleration lower then a+. It reaches Vmax at mid of tBR,
and keep the speed Vmax until end of batch interval.
Similar to Vdep−max, two possible situations of Vdep−min are expressed in Fig.4.6
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Figure 4.6: Min Departure Speed Range (a) The First Departure Situation (b) The
Second Situation
1. As presents in Fig.4.6(a), the current speed Vcurrent is fast enough for ve-
hicle to leave the SM region, therefore the minimum speed for vehicle to
leave Vdep−min is decided by decreasing speed until the end of tBR under the
assumption that the node can travel dremain (shadow region on figure).
2. The vehicle has to speed up in order to depart in tBR, therefore the node first
improve current speed from Vcurrent to Vdep−min, then keep it until the end of
batch interval. Shadow region on Fig.4.6(b) is the remaining distance.
According to the possibilities above, first situation is that the vehicle can leave
the region only by driving with current speed:
Vdep−min =
2·dremain
tBR
−Vcurrent (4.3)
Here assumes vehicle spends time t1 to speed up to Vdep−max, equations to calcu-
late Vdep−max are expressed below:

Vdep−max =Vcurrent + t1·a+
Vdep−max·(tBR− t1)+0.5· t1·(Vdep−max+Vcurrent)
= dremain
(4.4)
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Therefore, Vdep−max is computed by the summarised equation:
Vdep−min =Vcurrent +a+· tBR
+
√
2a+(Vcurrent · tBR−dremain)+a2+· t2BR
(4.5)
To sum up, LP can be generated by using Algorithm.1:
Algorithm 1 Leaving Probability Calculation
Input: : Current speed Vcurrent , distance to coverage border dremain, vehicle maximum positive
and negative acceleration a+&a−, batch interval tBR, maximum speed the vehicle can reach
Vlimit
Output: : Leaving Probability (LP): PL
1: MAX speed in tBR : Vmax−expect =Vcurrent +a+· tBR
2: if Vmax−expect ≥Vlimit then
3: dmax in tBR, keep improve speed until Vlimit ;
4: else
5: dmax in tBR, keep improve speed until Vmax−expect ;
6: end if
7: if dmax ≥ dremain then
8: Vdep−max = min(Vmax−expect ,Vlimit);
9: else
10: Set LP for this node Pu = 0;
11: end if
12: MIN speed in tBR : Vmin−expect =Vcurrent − tBR×a−
13: if Vcurrent · tBR ≥ dremain then
14: call equation (4.3) to calculate Vdep−min
15: else
16: call equation (4.5) to calculate Vdep−min
17: end if
18: Calculate maximum and minimum possible speed of the vehicle, Vmax and Vmin;
19: LP is calculated by employing Vdep−max, Vdepmin, Vmax and Vmin into equation (4.2);
20: End Algorithm
4.3 Leaving Ratio
Despite that the LP helps a lot to decide vehicle departure actions, in VCS sce-
nario, most of the vehicles have no chance to leave the communication group
before next batch edge since it is impossible for them to reach the speed to leave
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the region border after the current rekeying interval. For this reason, the Leaving
Ratio (LR) is involved to substitute LP as an extra parameter. This parameter is
designed as an index within the range (0,1]. LR is a ratio between rekeying inter-
val and time costs for vehicle leave the broadcast border. Similar to the definition
of LP, LR represents the inverse of a number of rekeying intervals using for the
vehicle to leave the group:
LR = min(1,
tBR
tout
) (4.6)
Here the parameter tout is the time cost for vehicle to leave, which can be
computed by equation:
tout =
dremain
Vcurrent
(4.7)
4.3.1 Joining User Sequence
According to the batch rekeying scheme in [66], there might have two possible
circumstances when the key tree manager tries to locate the new joining users.
a) New joining users fill into vacancies which are previously occupied by the
departure users.
b) New joining users form a subtree. The key tree manager inserts the subtree
into a key tree vacancy which is previously occupied by a departure user.
Both circumstances are related to insert fresh nodes in the order of LP and LR
values. In our scenario, nodes are arranged according to LP and LR with either
positive or negative sequence. LP is considered with higher priority compared to
LR during arranging work, LR is taken into operating if rest of the nodes are with
LP equal to zero. To make it clear, an example is illustrated here:
If the LP and LR values of joining users are arranged from higher values to
the lower values, thus the sequence should like:
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LPhigh > LPmed > LPlow > LRhigh > LRmed > LRlow
4.4 Performance Evaluation
In this section, we first present the assumption and setup details of the probabil-
ity based scenario, including the parameter assumptions and network structure.
Results and performance evaluation are illustrated afterwards. The results are
discussed in three parts, one is the results of node initial registration, while the
second one is the rekeying costs of our probability based batch rekeying scheme.
The processing time of the key management scheme is illustrated in the end.
4.4.1 Experimental Assumptions and Setup
Parameter Name Parameter Value
Length of RSU Coverage Area 600meters
Safety Message Transmit Power Pt−max 20mw
Overall Vehicle Number 210Vehicles
Number of Roads 8rows
Length of Rekeying Interval tBR 0.5s
Standard Derivation of The Traffic Distribution Function σ = 6.88
Mean of the Traffic Distribution Function µ = 46.56
Key Tree Degree Binary
Table 4.1: Assumption Of Parameter In The Probability-based Scenario
The assumed parameters are shown in Table.4.1. This scenario is set to have
each single RSU acting as AP to coverage the area with 600 meters diameter using
maximum transmit power Pt−max = 20mW which is specified in SAE J2945.1 [19].
To simulate the worst case with large number of communication nodes, Shorter
cover length is excluded from the assumptions as smaller coverage area contains
less vehicles nodes. The traffic simulator uses Veins [125] project. The key man-
ager is the SM which controls multiple RSUs to provide large network coverage
area. VCS network messages need decentralized management by SM cells due to
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the fact that the VCS is supposed to be employed on a large scale of geographical
territory. The SMs take most of the message processing task and multiple RSUs
are controlled by a single SM. Therefore SM in this scenario acts as central key
manager and a relay between vehicle nodes and administrator agency. The overall
number of 210 vehicles pass an 8-row road area. The number of vehicles and rows
are considered under saturated traffic condition. The saturated traffic aims to exam
our scheme under the worst case (as well as the heaviest burden of VCS). Speed
of vehicles follows normal distribution with µ = 46.56 and σ = 6.88 according to
the actual measurement in [128] under rush hours while the departure time follows
exponential distribution. Higher speed ranges are not considered in this scenario
because they stand for the off-peak traffic conditions (not the worst case) with
fewer participant nodes. To improve rekeying efficiency, the key tree structure of
this scenario is based on LKH [3] [99] with binary tree degree since higher tree
degrees result in more node individual encryption upon rekeying. Batch rekeying
is considered in the model with batch rekeying interval tBR is set to 0.5s.
The cryptographic schemes in the scheme are confirmed to use the schemes
mentioned above, ECIES is used as asymmetry encryption scheme, AES-CCM
is proposed as the symmetry scheme and the digital signature is generated using
ECDSA. ECC with elliptic curve secp160r1 in Crypto++ [130] is selected not only
for cryptographic scheme ECIES, but digital signature scheme ECDSA as well.
The length of ECIES ciphertext has 75 bytes to provide better security level. The
GK is the secret key with the AES-CCM scheme. The ciphertext of message pay-
load has 32 bytes, aiming to achieve better processing efficiency and acceptable
security level. All the ECDSA digital signatures have 42 bytes length.
Because of the key handover procedures in VCS scenario are simpler than
the handover between traditional wireless mobile networks, thus the key initial-
isation and key handover performance is illustrated without comparing with the
benchmark. To test the performance of the rekeying cost in the probability-based
scheme, the benchmark BR scheme in [66] is selected as the contrast scheme,
which is described in Chapter 3. The applied scenario of this scheme is the gen-
eral wireless mobile network and can be adapted to all the mobile networks, such
as VCS and wireless sensor networks. The mobile nodes in the scheme are as-
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sumed to have random moving trajectory which is different from the predictable
moving trajectory in VCS. Even though there are some incremental schemes based
on it, such as [67], but none of them focus on VCS scenario. Moreover, recent
researches in [131] and [132] still use [66] as the benchmark to compare the per-
formances.
4.4.2 Key Initialisation and handover Performances
Step Name Timestamp
1. Vehicle Joining t0 = 0ms
2. Registration Msg→ SM t1 = 2.910098956ms
3. SM Receives Msg t2 = 3.040167479ms
4. SM Checks Msg &→ PKI t3 = 4.350436255ms
5. PKI Receives Msg t4 = 7.350735578ms
6. PKI Checks Msg &→ SM t5 = 7.351695577ms
7. SM Receives Msg & Prepares Rekey-
ing Message
t6 = 7.372535577ms
8. Sends At Next Batch Edge: tsend = tBR and Wait Time: twait = tBR− t6
Rekeying Msg Preparation Time tprepare = 4.289728099ms
9. Sends Out Rekeying Message t7 = tBR = tsend
Vehicle receives Rekeying Message t8 = tBR+0.174698201ms
Table 4.2: RegTimestamp
Table.4.2 presents the time costs for a vehicle to initially register with a PKI
or handover to a new SM area when it tries to join a new broadcast group. Results
are simulated using OMNeT++ 4.5 [121] [125] with traffic simulator Veins. The
handshake steps in the table follow the procedures in Fig.4.2 and Fig.4.4. The
final step is n unique progress for BR, the key manager SM collects all the joining
and departing requests within this batch period, organises the positions of new
joining users and executes rekeying at the start of next batch interval. The rekeying
message has a multiple number of rekeying blocks which contains the updated
key information for all group members. The sequence of these rekeying blocks
follows the order of users in the key tree. The processing time tprepare requires
much longer time than other steps as the key manager needs to prepare multiple
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blocks.
Figure 4.7: Vehicle Joining Handshake Procedures With Detailed Time Data
Fig.4.7 shows the handshake procedures with detailed time receipt on them.
The processing time of 3ms is costed for the OBU on the vehicle to prepare the
handshake message, which is much less than the assumed batch interval. The mes-
sage propagation time over a wireless network is approximately 0.15ms. There-
fore the bandwidth resource cost can be neglected. The overall round-trip time of
the handshake procedures is around 9ms, a major part is the message processing
time, around 94%. To sum up, the access technologies of VCS can convey a large
number of rekeying and handover messages within each batch interval.
4.4.3 Rekeying Cost Performances
The probability-based scheme is simulated with benchmark scheme simultane-
ously to test if the probability issue helps to reduce the rekeying costs. The evalu-
ation investigates the performances from aspects of rekeying costs, with reference
to batch interval number. To get more reliable statistics and generate the smooth
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graph, 1000 times Monte Carlos simulations are introduced.
Figure 4.8: Rekeying Cost Of The Probability-based Scheme Comparing To The
Benchmark Scheme
Fig.4.8 demonstrates rekeying costs of two schemes during a traffic flow pass-
ing through. The dotted line and the solid line are the BR rekeying schemes in [66]
and the probability-based scheme, respectively. The two schemes show the same
results from start to around 80th batch interval, because of the probability issue
has not yet taken effect at the joining-only situation. Similar results are obtained
after 380th interval, as shown in Fig.4.9, which is a zoomed view of Fig.4.8. No
new joining activities appear after 380th batch interval.
The first node departing activity happens at 80th batch interval. Vehicle depart-
ing activities happen continuously from 80th to 120th intervals, leading to heavy
rekeying overhead in the benchmark scheme. Here the probability based scheme
cost around 33% of the rekey cost less than the benchmark scheme. The details are
shown in Fig.4.10. Whereas less rekeying cost appears in the probability-based
batch rekeying scheme when a node leaves suddenly, approximately 33% less
rekeying costs than the benchmark. Rekeying cost between 180th and 310th batch
intervals of Fig.4.8 are critical data since both joining and departing activities ap-
pear. Hence that’s the majority situation, for most key management schemes to
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Figure 4.9: Rekeying Cost Of The Probability-based Scheme Comparing To The
Benchmark Scheme. A Zoom-in View Between 80th And 180th Batch Intervals
Figure 4.10: Rekeying Cost Of The Probability-based Scheme Comparing To The
Benchmark Scheme. A Zoom-in View Between 180th And 310th Batch Intervals
focus on.
A zoom-in view of intervals between 180th and 310th are displayed in Fig.4.11.
This period is the stable phase of the VCS scenarios. Rekey cost for the bench-
mark algorithm has a significant increase at about 185th batch interval. This is be-
cause the departing users in the benchmark scheme are separated in the key tree.
A comparison of the probability-based approach to the benchmark scheme shows
that the probability-based scheme displays a more steady performance, meaning
better robustness. The benchmark scheme shows a significant fluctuation which
makes it difficult for the key manager to maintain the required Quality of Service
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Figure 4.11: Vehicle Joining Handshake
(QoS) through the entire working period. In addition, the overall rekeying cost is
much less than benchmark (average 18% less than the benchmark).
4.5 Summary
This chapter has presented a study of a novel key management scheme for group
secure communication in VCS environment. Probability factor has been intro-
duced into general GKM to help the key manager deciding how to organise key
tree properly. Simultaneously, a model of vehicle registration has demonstrated.
The rekeying cost is reduced by introducing the probability of vehicle departure
into the key tree. Three components have involved in the scheme, including the
GKM scheme, key initial registration and key handover.
The performance of the probability-based scheme has been compared with the
benchmark scheme in [66]. By simulating a vehicle group passing through dif-
ferent SM areas, the proposed scheme achieves a more efficiency and robustness
batch rekeying algorithm comparing to the benchmark key management scheme.
The simulation is assumed under the heaviest communication traffic level which
contains maximum number of mobile nodes inside the coverage area. Therefore
only the rush hour traffic speed model and longest road length can represent the
heaviest communication burden. The probability-based scheme gives a steady
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performance when large number vehicle nodes attempt to depart the communi-
cation group. Because they are organised within the close key tree branches.
According to the simulation results, the overall rekeying cost can be saved ap-
proximately 18% comparing to the existing BR schemes.
The key initialisation and the handover procedures have been combined to-
gether and also simulated to test the overall round trip time of handshake proce-
dures. The key initial registration and handover steps share the similar message
formats which decrease the rekeying overhead in the network. The procedure
acts as the foundation steps to implement further key management schemes. The
overall handshake time costs acceptable processing time comparing to the batch
rekeying interval length. For this reason, the proposed scheme controls the mes-
sage processing and propagation time within the limited range so that the key
management performance is not affected.
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Chapter 5
Key Management Optimisation
Using Distributed Ledger
Technology (DLT)
In Vehicular Communication System (VCS), the network security can be ad-
dressed through secured group broadcast. Therefore, secure key management
schemes are considered as the key technique to enhance network security. Key
management includes novel Group Key Management (GKM) and key handover
aspects. The Chapter 4 provides a key management scheme which helps to main-
tain a more efficient key tree structure. However, the probability-based scheme
achieves fewer improvements on the key handover procedures. In this chapter, a
framework for providing secure key management within the heterogeneous net-
work is proposed to accelerate the key handover speed.
The novel Distribution Ledger Technology (DLT) concept is introduced into
the proposed scheme to simplify the key handover (also called the key transfer
handshake) procedures in order to achieve better efficiency. The default DLT is
assumed to use blockchain technology [50]. The blockchain is a synchronised
and distributed ledger which stores a list of blocks. Blocks record user informa-
tion and a receipt to link to the previous block. In the blockchain based scheme,
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the third-party authorities (central managers) are removed from the network op-
erating and the key handover processes are processed by the SM network. The
decentralised management structure gives two advantages, namely better robust-
ness and higher communication efficiency. The decentralised structure prevents
the entire network failure when the central manager disconnects to the rest of the
network. Moreover, decentralised structure distributed the management function
to multiple nodes which allows user to select the nearest manager. The message
handover requests are broadcasted into the network for nodes to authenticate. The
key handover records are shared within the SM network to create the block. The
new block is attached to the ledger if the messages pass the authentication process.
With the help of the simplified structure, handover message propagation between
security domains can be accelerated since the information is directly sent to the
destination rather than passing the messages through central managers. Moreover,
the distributed structure of blockchain network performs better robustness under
the single point of failure.
To the best of our knowledge, the DLT-based network structure is the first time
to be deployed on the VCS scenario. In this contribution, I have developed a novel
framework which uses decentralised topology based on the blockchain structure.
The time consumption results of heterogeneous key management are compared
with that in the traditional network structure to evaluate the performances of the
blockchain based scheme.
5.1 System Model
The proposed approach assumes that the VCS normally have four layers. Three
layers on the side of service providers, while the user side occupies a single layer
[30]. As shown in Fig.5.1, three layers on the side of the service provider, namely,
RSUs, SMs and Central Managers. The VCS infrastructure has communication
device embedding with wireless communication module based on the VCS stan-
dards (Either IEEE 802.11p or LTE-V). Meanwhile, vehicles are required to equip
OBUs to support the corresponding VCS standards. Safety messages are period-
89
Figure 5.1: The Network Hierarchy Of The Vehicular Communication System
ically sent by OBU, which are collected by RSUs that are built along the road
at regular intervals in order to provide maximum network coverage. RSUs act
as AP which offer interfaces to route and relay messages between vehicles and
upper-level infrastructures.
The upper-level infrastructures include SMs and top-level authorities. Each
SM has their own logical coverage area which is called security domain. The
top-level infrastructure normally refers to the central manager to manage all the
cryptographic materials. SMs are placed at the second layer which manages cryp-
tography materials of different security domains. It is proposed to install SMs in
a geographically sparse manner, one for each security domain. Central managers
rule the network on the first (top) layer, they are also known as the Public Key
Infrastructure (PKI). Vehicles’ permanent identities, certificates, pseudonyms are
calculated and authenticated at PKI to issue legal identities using in VCS.
5.1.1 Traditional Structure
Traditional structure strictly uses the aforementioned four-layer hierarchy. As
shown in Fig.5.2, Security Domain A is an area which is managed by SM-A.
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Figure 5.2: Traditional Structure Of Vehicular Communication System
PKIs take the role of central managers at the top level. Each PKI manages mul-
tiple numbers of SMs, the number depends on the geographical topology of the
area. The traditional network structure employs PKI at the top of the network to
manage cryptography materials, the PKI includes CA, AS and other third-party
infrastructures to manage applications. This however makes the network an in-
efficient key exchange, and will require unnecessary handshakes if a car passes
from one security domain to another. When a vehicle attempts to join a new
geographic region in which infrastructures are managed by a new PKI, it keeps
sending the safety message which contains the speed and position information.
The previous SM-A (Previous SM) picks up the safety message and recognises
the border crossing activity from the information inside the safety message. Then
SM-A generates a border crossing request along with useful information related
to the vehicle and forwards all these materials to the PKI-A (Previous PKI). The
request will be forwarded to the PKI-B (New PKI) if it has passed the verification
steps. PKI-B will inform SM-B (New SM) about the border crossing activity with
necessary cryptography materials, after it checks the correctness of the request.
Rekeying procedures will be triggered in the new area after new SM has received
and checked such cryptography materials.
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5.1.2 DLT-Based Structure
Figure 5.3: Distributed Ledger Technology Based Structure Of Vehicular Com-
munication System
The above procedures in the traditional structure delay the key transferring
between two security domains. Different to the traditional structure, the functions
of the central manager on the top level are merged into SM in blockchain based
structure. In this case, SM takes over the role of the network manager. As presents
in Fig.5.3, the central manager is placed in an isolated environment to dedicated
generate cryptographic materials for vehicles. Cryptographic materials, such as
vehicle identities, pseudonyms and pseudonym certificates, are supposed to be
kept in a secured facility to cope with the privacy and security purposes [133].
Thus the central managers are accessed under the following three situations. (i)
Initial registration. New vehicles need to apply for the initial registration when
they leave the manufacturer and first participate in a new security domain. (ii)
Change the identity-related information. Vehicles must to periodically change
their pseudonym set, as well as all the cryptographic materials related to this
pseudonym. Thus they need to contact the central manager to generate a new
set of cryptographic identity for them. Although privacy is not considered in the
contributions of this thesis, but the cryptographic of pseudonyms are related to the
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security problems. (iii) Adversary revocation. In the blockchain based structure,
malicious behaviours are recognised by using blockchain look-up. Identity (in-
cluding pseudonyms) of the adversary is publicised once the malicious behaviours
have been confirmed.
Similar to the bitcoin network, the function of blockchain enables nodes to
share information without the need of centralised secure this ledger by a central
manager. SM is connected to the SM network which connects other SMs within
different security domains. The SM network uses Peer-to-peer (P2P) structure and
operates like a cloud network. In the DLT-based network, the information in safety
messages is encapsulated into transactions if they indicate a handover (across the
border between SMs) action. The secret key is encrypted into a transaction using
the public key of neighbour SM. The transaction is then shared with all the SMs
inside the SM network for authentication. Aside from this, the SMs take the role
of miners which forms transaction within a period of time into a block. As a
reward, miners are allowed to get their block authenticated by the SM network.
The DLT based key handover scheme is to transport keys by mining blocks so
that a blockchain can be maintained for heterogeneous key management purpose,
at least within a local SM domain. As a result, the keys of new joining members
are delivered by retrieving the information from the block.
5.2 Mobile Node Handover
Before the detailed simulation results are demonstrated, the key handover hand-
shake procedures are introduced in this section. The conventional key handover
steps are illustrated in the first place. The proposed DLT-based key handover
scheme is shown afterwards.
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5.2.1 Handover in the Traditional Structures
The conventional handover schemes in [109] [110] are designed based on the
unpredictable node movement trajectories. Fortunately, vehicle movement trajec-
tories are easily predicted in VCS scenario due to the fact that the vehicle sends
safety messages and SM knows all the driving status of vehicles under its cover-
age area. For this reason, the conventional handover steps can be triggered by the
Home Agent (HA) instead of Foreign Agent (FA). In the VCS traditional struc-
ture, we assume the SMs take the job of HA and FA and RSUs only for improving
coverage area. The current registered SM acts as HA, while the SM in the about-
to-join domain is the FA. Additionally, malicious behaviours in VCS can easily
endanger human life, it requires a top-level security to deliver trusted service. The
requirement is fulfilled by equipping server who supervises user data. Thus, the
handshakes between SMs are checked by infrastructure inside PKI in a mandatory
manner.
Figure 5.4: Conventional Handshake Procedures Of Cross-domain Handover In
Traditional Structure
The cross domains handshake procedures in the traditional network are shown
in Fig.5.4. Before the key management scheme runs, the network sets a collection
period based on the traffic level. The board cross activities (handover) are formed
into individual transactions. SM-A (previous SM) picks up all the transactions
from safety messages within this transaction period. SM-A sends these transac-
tions one by one to PKI-A (previous PKI) to proof. The message format is shown
in the step 1 in below. To assure security, the digital signature and certificate are
checked to proof the authenticity and integrity. The ciphertext is decrypted using
PKI-A’s private key and re-encrypted using PKI-B’s public key. That’s because
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the original ciphertext is secured using PKI-A’s public key and PKI-B doesn’t
have the corresponding key to decrypt. During the proofreading, the proved trans-
actions are translated into a new version which is readable by PKI-B (next PKI).
The above message format is shown in the step 2. In the step 3, the PKI-B re-
peats the checking steps after receiving the transaction packet and convert them
into SM-B readable version. Finally, all the cross-border requests arrive at SM-B,
packing in transaction packet. A handshake message flow is shown below with
details. Where En{∗} stands for the encryption activities using Elliptic Curve
Integrated Encryption Scheme (ECIES) scheme[127], Sig{∗} is the signing con-
ducts using Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm (ECDSA) scheme [79].
PK∗ and SK∗ are elliptic curve based public and private key pairs, respectively.
1. SM-A sends transactions to PKI-A :
En{info}PKPKI-A +destSM+Sig{Cipher+destSM}SKSM-A
2. PKI-A f orwards the transaction packet to PKI-B :
En{info}PKPKI-B +destSM+Sig{Cipher+destSM}SKPKI-A
3. PKI-B f orwards the transaction packet to SM-B :
En{info}PKSM-B +destSM+Sig{Cipher+destSM}SKPKI-B
Figure 5.5: Conventional Handshake Procedures Of Same-domain Handover In
Traditional Structure
The handshake steps are simplified if SMs in both sides are in the same se-
curity domain. The formats of the handshake messages are presented below. In
the step 1, SM-A-1 forwards transactions to PKI-A to proof the authenticity and
integrity. In this same domain scenario, both SMs are under managed by the
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same PKI. Therefore there is no need to translate transactions into another version
which is dedicated to other PKIs. Similar to the cross-domain version above, SM-
A-2 receives transactions from transaction packet in the end. The aforementioned
steps are presented in Fig.5.5.
1. SM-A-1 sends transactions to PKI-A :
En{info}PKPKI-A +destSM+Sig{Cipher+destSM}SKSM-A
2. PKI-A f orwards the transaction packet to SM-A-2 :
En{info}PKSM-A-2 +destSM+Sig{Cipher+destSM}SKPKI-A
5.2.2 Handover in the DLT-Based Structures
Figure 5.6: Handshake Procedures Of Cross-domain Handover In Distributed
Ledger Technology Based Structure
Depending on the description above, it is tedious to force the key handover
messages passing PKI. The key handover handshake could thus be simplified by
introducing DLT. The decentralised DLT-based blockchain structure helps to min-
imise the network structure which helps the messages to be verified by SM net-
work but not the top-level or the third party authorities. The blockchain structure
removes PKIs. The network is supervised through the mining process and mining
results which are delivered by SMs. A simplified handshake graph is shown in
Fig.5.6 and the message handshakes with message formats are shown below. Col-
lection period allows several transactions to be broadcasted into SM network and
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picked up by SMs in the network. Digital signatures and certificates in the trans-
actions are processed to verify if the information in the transactions is trustworthy.
Ciphertext in transactions is kept from decryption until they reach the destination
SM since the ciphertext is encrypted using the public key of the destination SM.
According to the nature of blockchain mining, transactions are inserted into the
block in random order which is decided by SMs. Last but not least, the above
block will be mined using mining algorithm and the mined block will be broad-
casted back to the network. The above procedures are presented as follows:
1. SM-A sends transactions to SM-Cloud :
En{info}PKSM-dest +destSM+Sig{Cipher+destSM}SKSM-A
2. SM-Cloud returns the mined block to SM-A :
5.3 DLT-based Structure
5.3.1 Transaction Format
Transaction Header
Hashed result of the transaction
Number of this transaction in block
Current security domain number SM-this
Destination security domain number SM-dest
Vehicle identity materials
including the encrypted vehicle pseudonym and certificate
Signature of this transaction to ensure integrity and authentication
The Signature is generated using Private key of SM: SKSM-this
Payload Field: (Encrypted Transaction Information)
Cipher = En{info}PKSM-dest
Table 5.1: The Format of Transaction
Transactions are designed to encapsulate key transfer materials from the source
SM to the destination SM. Six fields are proposed to contain useful information
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inside the transaction header of our previous papers which follow the typical trans-
action format of blockchain applications Table.5.1 [134] [31]. The first field is the
results of the rest five fields which is calculated through the hash function. The
transaction number shows the position of this transaction in the block. The value
of this field varies depending on how SM organises the transaction sequence. The
current and the destination SM number are equivalent to the currency input and
output of bitcoin applications, respectively [50]. The identity materials including
the pseudonym and certificate of the handover vehicle which are encrypted us-
ing the public key of the destination SM. The signature occupies the last position
of the transaction to maintain the authentication, integrity and non-repudiation of
key transfer information.
The Table.5.1 shows the payload field too. Here info is the identity and vehi-
cle status materials in the transaction, including the certificate, pseudonym, speed,
heading and other status data. To keep the confidentiality of the information in
transactions, identity materials and vehicle status data are encrypted using desti-
nation SM’s public key. As a result, the information stays unreadable to the SM
network expect the destination SM. Privacy-related information is encrypted into
ciphertext En{in f o}PK-dest using destination SM’s public key PKdest. Signature
is computed using both ciphertext and the number of destination SM, signed us-
ing source SM’s private key SKthis. Encrypted the privacy related information
combined with digitally signed transaction contents ensure that an adversary can-
not act as a normal node, or amend and eavesdrop cross-domain requests, as that
would require the adversary to forge a signature. Simultaneously, other SMs are
able to examine if this transaction is legitimate or not. Similarly, a malicious user
cannot read anything from the encrypted message, as only the destination SM has
the key to decrypt the message.
5.3.2 Block Format
The block header is constructed by six fields, as illustrated in the Table.5.2, simi-
lar to the bitcoin block structure [134]. In this contribution, all the blocks have the
same block version value in the first field since all the blocks are used to transfer
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Block Header
Field Description
Version Block Version Number
Previous Block Hash Hash of the previous block in the chain
Merkle Tree Root Hash of the Merkle tree root RootM
Timestamp Creation time of this block
Targeted Difficulty The Proof-Of-Work difficulty target
Nonce A counter for the Proof-Of-Work
Block Payload (Transactions)
Transaction No.1 · · · Transaction No.n
Table 5.2: The Format of Block
handover requests. However, the field can be further developed to indicate other
DLT applications. The second field links the block to its parent block together.
This field helps blocks linking to each and creates a chain structure to generate
the ledger. All the transactions in a single block are merged into the Merkle tree
root [135]. Merkle tree root assures the integrity of transactions since even a sin-
gle alteration on transactions can cause a totally different value of Merkle root
value. Time tampering is prevented by checking the timestamp field. A target
mining solution is a 256-bit number with number of zeros at the start of the hash
result of the block header [119]. The number of zeros is denoted as nzeros and it
also the targeted difficulty in the mining algorithm. SM collects all the transac-
tions within a pre-agreed period (transaction collection period) of time and sorts
these transactions in arbitrary order into a block. In this way, blocks are able to
aggregate multiple cross-border requests.
The payload field of a block is comprised of verified transactions that SMs
collect within the transaction collection period, denoted by tCP. These transactions
are connected to each and packed into the same block. The theoretical number of
transactions is decided by tCP and the number of passing vehicles in each hour
(nH). An expression of nT is shown in the following equation.
number o f transactions =
nH
3600s/hour
× tCP (5.1)
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5.3.3 Proof-of-Work Algorithm
Algorithm 2 Calculate Nonce (Proof-Of-Work)
Input: : Information to create Candidate Block Header H: Block Version VB, Previous Block
Hash Hashprev, Timestamp tnow, difficulty number d and transactions Trans = [T1,T2...Tn]
Output: : Nonce value nonce
1: Initialise bool variable gotAns = FALSE;
2: while (NOR gotAns) do
3: The transaction order arand = randPerm(n)
by permuting integers within range [1, n];
4: Calculate Merkle tree root RootM based on arand;
5: Create the hashed block header Htemp
Where Htemp =VB||Hashprev||RootM||tnow||d;
6: Initialise tries number nonce = 0; Hash output result;
7: while (NOR gotAns & NOT got Proof-Of-Work from network) do
8: result = dhash(Htemp||nonce);
9: nonce ++ ;
10: if (result has at least d padding zeros in front & NOT got
11: Proof-Of-Work from network ) then
12: Write (nonce - 1) into nonce field;
13: gotAns = TRUE;
14: return (nonce - 1);
15: else if (receive Proof-Of-Work from Network) then
16: gotAns = TRUE;
17: return NULL;
18: end if
19: end while
20: end while
21: End Algorithm
The smooth operation of DLT network is achieved by mutual supervision of
participant nodes. In blockchain, the mutual supervision is expressed in form of
the proof-of-work. The proof-of-work is a digital receipt which is hard to calculate
but easy for others to verify [50]. A one-way cryptographic hash function, double
SHA-256, dhash(), is used to calculate the proof-of-work. Where the double
SHA-256 is calculated as follows:
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Algorithm 3 Proof the Block
Input: : Mined Block Header Hmined ; Block payload Bpayload
Output: : Bool variable isCorrect
1: Extract nonce value: nonce = getNonce( Hmined );
2: Calculate Merkle Tree Root RootM based on the transactions in Bpayload;
3: Create header: Hverify =VB||Hashprev||RootM||tnow||d;
4: The string to verify: Inputverify = Hverify||nonce;
5: Calculate the hashed value of the string: result = dhash( Inputverify );
6: if (result has at least d padding zeros in front) then
7: isCorrect = TRUE;
8: else
9: isCorrect = FALSE;
10: end if
11: return isCorrect;
12: End Algorithm
hashed result = dhash(input) = SHA-256(SHA256(input))
The hash of the block header is calculated by SMs. The input to the double
SHA-256 is consist of the block header and nonce value. This candidate input is
hashed repeatedly using different nonce value until the resulting hash value starts
with the numbers of zeros (matches the difficulty requirement). The nonce value
is a plain number to counter of times to the hash calculations. As mentioned in
the block format section above, the transactions are placed in block payload in
random order. The reason to use this organisation layout is because it forces dif-
ferent SMs having different mining time. The random order provides an extent of
stochasticity, leading to distinct header hash results. To be more precisely, differ-
ent header hash results make SMs mining same sets of the transaction in different
time lengths. Therefore, block conflicts are prevented in advance. Algorithm.2
shows a summarised pseudocode of mining procedure. Algorithm.3 gives a de-
tailed overview of necessary procedures for proofing a mined block.
Algorithm.2 gives a detailed overview of necessary procedures for proofing a
mined block.
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5.4 Time Composition
Parent Field Description of Parent Field
tprep
The time cost to prepare block
which will be mined later
ttransfer
Transmission time cost in SM network
including CSMA back-off time
tprocessing
Processing time for message Encryption,
Decryption, Signing and Verification
Child Field Description of Child Field
trand Calculation time to generate random transaction sequence
tfill Time cost to insert transactions into the block message
tmerkle Calculation time to get Merkle Tree Root
theader Processing time to prepare block header
tBO Average CSMA back-off time
tP Propagation time in network cable
tE Processing time to encrypt plain text (ECIES)
tD Processing time to decrypt cipher text (ECIES)
tS Processing time to sign messages (ECDSA)
tV Processing time to verify signature (ECDSA)
Table 5.3: The Time Elements of Processing Procedures
Table.5.3 shows all the time elements that composes the key transfer time.
For traditional structure, all the time variables in tprocessing are taken into account,
while tV is the only one to be considered in blockchain structure. Message transfer
time ttransfer including the information propagation time in cable, as well as the
random back-off time in the CSMA/CA protocol which is specified in SAE J2735
[18]. The variable tprep is dedicated to blockchain applications, containing time
cost variables to create a new block.
As describes above, processing time for three situations are summarised in
Equation.(5.2)-(5.4). Where nT is the average number of transactions among
a single collection period. Variable tTC, tTS and tB are processing time of key
transfer procedures in cross-domain traditional structure, same-domain traditional
structure and blockchain structure, respectively.
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tTC = nT× (tV+ tD+ tE+ tS)×2+(tBO+ tP)×3 (5.2)
tTS = nT× (tV+ tD+ tE+ tS)+(tBO+ tP)×2 (5.3)
Equation.(5.2) and (5.3) describe the time components in the traditional struc-
ture. Due to the fact that PKIs in the traditional structure must verify and translate
transactions to the neighbour PKIs or SMs. Both situations take all the elements
in tprocessing into calculation. For the cross-domain scenario, the above processes
are designed to be implemented twice.
tB = nT× tV+(tBO+ tP)×2+ tprep+ tM (5.4)
Equation.(5.4) expresses that only signature verification is required in trans-
action checking. However, mining time tM and block preparation steps are at-
tached into overall processing time in order to extend the blockchain.
5.5 Performance Evaluation
The performance evaluation of the DLT-based key management scheme is carried
out using network simulations. Performance evaluation is broken into two parts.
The first part studies the processing time of cryptographic schemes and mining
algorithms, namely encryption, decryption, signing, verification, block mining
and block preparation. The comparison of processing time results between the
blockchain structure and the traditional structure is demonstrated in the second
part. The second part simulation is first tested on a small scale of the network,
aiming to test the basic performance. Large scale network is proposed to test the
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scalability of the DLT-based scheme.
5.5.1 Experimental Assumptions and Setup
Parameter Name Parameter Value
Distance Between SMs 5000meters
Mining difficulty (number of zeros) 3
Traffic amount per hour 15000,12000,9000,6000,3000
Length of transaction collection time 0.5s,0.6s,0.7s,0.8s,0.9s,1.0s
Number of neighbour cells 2,3,4,5
Vehicle Joining Event’s Distribution Exponential distribution [136]
Mining speed 250 Khashes per second
Maximum Transaction Range
For Large Scale Simulation: 1000 Transactions
Block Preparation
Maximum Transaction Range
For Large Scale Simulation: 2000 Transactions
Key Handover Proessing Time
Table 5.4: Assumption of Scenario Parameters
The assumed parameters are shown in Table.5.4. The scenario is set to test
the key handover performances at a border area between two security domains
which are managed by different SMs. The simulation uses OMNeT++ 4.5 [121]
with the dedicated traffic simulator (Veins) packet [125]. The DLT-based VCS
networks need decentralized management by the SM network in order to simplify
the network structure. This aims to improve the key management efficiency in
large scale geographical area. SMs in this scenario act as the key manager and a
relay between local security domain and the foreign domains. The results depend
only on the overall number of transactions as it focuses on the processing time
in terms of transaction numbers. Thus the simulation setup is compromised the
following steps:
i. At end of each tCP, a certain number of transactions flooding into the SM net-
work. The movement of vehicles are not considered in these two parts;
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ii. Each SM records the processing time results of cryptography schemes and
block preparation. The results are records by averaging the results from
SMs;
iii. Transactions ranging from 0 to 200 is set for test cryptographic schemes to
get a zoom-in view of results.
An average distance of 5000 meters is assumed between SMs, while the dis-
tance between SM and RSU is set to 1000 meters. To test the basic performance,
the upper and lower bounds of vehicle traffic are considered under a saturated and
off-peak traffic conditions of the busiest cities in the world, such as Beijing, which
is considered as one of the most crowded cities in the world. The saturated traf-
fic is set to have 15,000 vehicles passing a road in an hour, aiming to exam our
scheme under the worst case (as well as the heaviest burden of VCS), while the
off-peak time has 3,000 vehicles per hour. The transaction collection time periods
from half second to one second are selected to provide more traffic variety. The
number of neighbour SMs is defined by 2 and 5. The cross-border events follow
the exponential distribution.
For the large scale simulation, up to 1000 transactions are introduced in block
preparation simulations so that the exponential growth of results can be demon-
strated. Maximum 2000 transactions are simulated to test the time value differ-
ences between blockchain and tradition structures. The benchmark is selected as
the schemes in [109] and [110]. They are both use the conventional handover
handshake procedures. This helps to clarify the improvement between the DLT-
based scheme and the conventional scheme.
The specification of hardware and cryptographic schemes are shown below.
blocks are mined by our laptop with Intel Core i5 and 8GB RAM and display
card GeForce 920M. This device can finish 250K hash calculations per second.
ECIES with elliptic curve secp160r1 in Crypto++ [130] is selected not only for
cryptographic scheme ECIES, but digital signature scheme ECDSA as well. Ci-
pher block has a length of 75 bytes which is because ECIES provides much better
security level.
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5.5.2 Processing Time of Cryptographic Schemes
The performance evaluation first studies the processing time cost for cryptographic
schemes. It aims to obtain the accurate data of elements in Table.5.3 and further
complete the result of Equation.(5.2)-(5.4).
Figure 5.7: Computation Time Of Cryptographic Schemes With Respect To The
Transaction Number
The key handover time is built up with the computation time data of cryp-
tographic schemes. Therefore the time costs of different schemes are simulated
in the first part of this contribution. Fig.5.7 shows the performance of different
cryptographic schemes which are used in key transfer procedures. Except for the
mining time cost, the processing time increases linearly with the growth of trans-
action number. The mining algorithm always mines a single header due to the fact
that block header is able to contain multiple transactions. The mining processing
time is an average value of multiple simulations. the practice value is highly likely
to have a value below this average value as only the fastest mined block is accepted
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by the network. The encryption and decryption schemes cost similar processing
time. Signature verification costs the longest computation time among schemes.
According to the Equation.(5.2)-(5.4), signature verification plays a key compo-
nent in key transfer time. Table.5.5 records the average processing time for each
cryptographic scheme.
Cryptography Scheme Processing Time (Milliseconds)
ECIES Encryption 0.51027
ECIES Decryption 0.73996
ECDSA Signing 0.51011
ECDSA Verifing 1.10171
Block Mining 4.11046
Table 5.5: Average Cryptography Processing Time
Figure 5.8: The Block Preparation Time With Respect To The Transaction Num-
ber
Fig.5.8 plots the block preparation time in terms of various transaction num-
bers. The preparation time increases exponentially with respect to the growth of
transaction number. The processing time slowly increases like quasi-linear be-
fore 300 transactions. Processing time over 0.1 seconds when transaction bigger
than 400. Finally, preparation time reaches 0.95 seconds when there are 1000
transactions. The non-linear curve is caused by exponentially increasing of trand,
while rest of the preparation time components increase linearly in proportion to
the transaction number.
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5.5.3 Handover Time
Figure 5.9: Average Number Of Transactions Under Different Traffic Level
As one of the most important metrics to measure the performance of blockchain,
the number of transactions in DLT related research is how many transactions
are mined in a second. However in VCS scenarios, an alternative definition is
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used to fit the nature of VCS. It is the average number of transactions in a block.
Fig.5.9 demonstrates the average transaction number under different traffic level
and different transaction collection time. The transaction number increases ap-
proximately two times, as the transaction collection period lengthens from 0.5s
to 1.0s or the number of neighbour cells increases from 2 to 5. The maximum
average transaction number (under five neighbour cells and transaction collec-
tion period of 1.0s) is three and four times of the minimum one (two neighbour
cells and transaction collection period of 0.5s) for lower and higher traffic levels,
respectively. The reason for the cross-border requests increasing is that longer
transaction collection period helps SMs to witness more vehicles passing the bor-
der. Abide by the similar reason, more neighbour cells stand for more borders to
be monitored, and therefore enlarges the amount of transactions.
The performance of key transmission is measured by the block propagation
time from the current SM to destination SM. It is expected that higher transaction
collection time causes the SM to insert more cross-border requests into blocks.
Similarly, a higher number of neighbours lengthens the key transmission time in a
similar way. Both of the aforementioned ways are equivalent to add traffic level.
To investigate the key transmission time in detail, we simulate the handshake pro-
cessing time for the blockchain structure in comparison with the key handover in
the traditional VCS network structure, as shown in Fig.5.10 and Fig.5.11. For
clarity, we consider the traffic amount under 6000 vehicles per hour as off-peak
mode, while the vehicle number above 12000 per hour is classified as peak mode.
Fig.5.10 compares key transmission time cost under off-peak traffic conditions.
Blockchain structure costs more processing time when there has 3000 vehicles
running on the road per hour. This is because block preparation and mining cost
more time than just verifying and encrypting one or two messages. However, as
can be seen from the results of 6000 vehicles per hour, time costs in the tradi-
tional structure increase proportional to the traffic level goes up, while results in
blockchain structure remain steady respect to different traffic amounts. Moreover,
time costs of traditional structure exceed the blockchain results when neighbour
cells more than 4 and transaction collection longer than 0.7 seconds.
Fig.5.11 shows results of time cost under higher traffic amounts, that are,
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Figure 5.10: Key Transmission Execution Time Regards To Transaction Number
Under Off-peak Traffic Level
12000 and 15000 vehicles per hour. As the level of traffic increases, the process-
ing time in traditional structure increases significantly. Theoretically speaking, as
the traditional network processes messages one by one, the processing time cost
should increase in proportion to the transactions. The results proof the theory
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Figure 5.11: Key Transmission Execution Time Regards To Transaction Number
Under Peak Traffic Level
above: the time costs under transaction collection time of 1.0s double the value of
that under collection time of 0.5s, as twice of the collection time means there have
nearly two times of cross-border requests. Similar to the aforementioned analyses,
results of 5 neighbours are approximately 2.5 times of the time cost of 2 neigh-
bours. On the other hand, the time cost in blockchain network shows a smooth
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and steady surface under any traffic conditions. This is because transactions are
aggregated into a single Merkle tree root and only one block is mined each time
no matter how many transactions in the network.
Figure 5.12: Processing time comparison between structures and schemes (a)
Time cost values when hand over within same security domain (b) Time cost
values when hand over across different security domains
Fig.5.12 depicts the key transfer performances of blockchain scheme and tra-
ditional scheme with respect to varying the number of transactions. The results of
schemes in [109] [110] and the handover procedures in Chapter 4 are used as the
benchmark of the simulation which aims to show the performance improvement
by using our scheme, referring to the conventional structure results on the figure.
The key handover procedures in the Chapter 4 is also demonstrated on the graph
as the traditional structure results. Comparison of the different performances of
key handover within the same security domain is shown in the Fig.5.12(a). All the
results have zero processing time when border across actions does not appear in
the network. It takes approximately 0.8 seconds to finish transfer 500 transactions,
while nearly double the time is costed to handle the same amount of transactions in
the traditional structure. The conventional scheme costs more than triple the han-
dover time of blockchain structure. However, two curves have an intersection at
around 1300 transactions due to the nonlinear increase of blockchain key transfer
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time. Although our scheme cost more processing time due to the growing number
of transactions, our schemes provide better scalability against the traditional struc-
ture when transaction number less than 1300. Additionally, our blockchain based
scheme saves nearly half of the processing time at transaction number equalling to
1300 and the time results always below the traditional scheme when transactions
no less than 2000. According to the saturated traffic level in Beijing, rush hour has
15,000 vehicles passing a road. This means approximately four vehicles passing
a road per second. Thus 1000 transactions can support the key handover on up
to 250 roads which is enough for most city scenarios. Similar contradistinction
is demonstrated in the Fig.5.12(b) to show the result of situation (ii). CA trans-
lates messages from one security domain to another in the conventional scheme.
For the traditional structure in this situation, two CAs need to communicate with
each other in order to finish the key transfer. Thus extra handshakes between CAs
cause tedious key transfer time in the traditional structure. Handover time cost of
the conventional scheme and traditional structure exceed 10 seconds when trans-
action number more than 800 and 1750, respectively. The blockchain scheme
costs much less time. To summarise, blockchain structure has better scalability
performance against the traditional structure in situation (ii) due to less process-
ing time cost.
5.6 Summary
After the rekeying overhead reducing in the Chapter 4, the key management field
has extended to the key handover management for heterogeneous VCS networks.
In the traditional network, a key transmission message is first verified by the local
domain PKI. The re-encrypted and resigned messages are sent to the neighbour
PKI for further verification. Finally, the message is processed again to guarantee
that it is readable for lower layer SMs. These procedures, however, make the key
transmission handshakes tediously. The blockchain concept takes advantage of
the simplified structure. The third party central authorities are set aside since the
verification job is delivered by SM network. The blockchain concept improves
key transportation efficiency by decreasing the key transmission time. Crossing
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border activities are formed into transactions and arranged into the block. SMs
play the role of miners to verify the blocks. Hence the key transmission execution
time is composed of block preparation time and mining time, instead of multi-
ple verification steps. With the help of blockchain, a faster and more steady key
transmission time between the two security domains has been presented.
The simulation results have shown that the key transmission cost in blockchain
network holds steady, that means better scalability. Specifically speaking, less
key handover time has been consumed in the blockchain based scheme than the
traditional handover scheme if the transaction number lower than 1300 and the
handover happens within the same security domain. Additionally, the blockchain
based scheme always provides better results if the handover happens across secu-
rity domains. In the same domain and cross domains scenarios, the results prove
the proposed scheme gives shorter key handover time if the transaction number
less than 1000. 1000 transactions are able to support the key handover requests
on maximum 250 roads in most of the large scale cities.
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Chapter 6
Efficient Key Management Using
Dynamic Transaction Collection
Periods
As discussed in the Chapter 5, the key handover procedures can be simplified by
introducing Distributed Ledger Technology (DLT) to optimise the network struc-
ture. However, there still has room to improve the capability of the DLT-based
Vehicular Communication System (VCS) platform. Based on the summary of the
Chapter 5, the transaction number in a block decides the overall performance of
key handover. High transaction number leads to a long delay on key handover,
while low transaction number causes inefficient key handover as they still con-
sume a certain amount of the processing power. Thus it is necessary to control the
number of transactions so that the system can achieve sustainable high efficient
performance.
The dynamic transaction collection periods help to adjust the transaction num-
ber with respect to various traffic levels. This dynamic scheme allows SMs to
flexibly fit various traffic levels by changing the length of the transaction collec-
tion periods. The network framework uses the DLT-based network structure, key
handover algorithm follows the blockchain based handover algorithm. The frame-
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work introduces the dynamic transaction collection period which further reduces
the key transfer time during vehicles handover, as well as controls the computa-
tion power under an acceptable level. Extensive simulations and analysis show
the effectiveness and efficiency of the dynamic elements, in which the dynamic
transaction collection performances better in term of key transfer time than the
scheme using fixed transaction collection period.
6.1 Dynamic Transaction Collection Algorithm
Due to the fact that the network structure and basic key handover algorithm (such
as the blockchain algorithm, block format, transaction format and mining algo-
rithm) inherits from the DLT-based key management scheme, only the dynamic
transaction collection algorithm is described in this section. The proposed dy-
namic key management scheme is achieved by using dynamic transaction collec-
tion periods. To decrease the side effect of variables, the method of controlling
variables is employed in our scheme.
In order to have a reasonable metric to measure the results, a time period of one
second is selected as the standard metric to measure the performances of various
collection periods. Here assumes that nT-All is a sum up number of transactions
which contains all the key handover activities on all the roads. tB-1 is the average
processing time measured in one second under various collection periods. nR is
the number of roads that is taken into calculation. Based on the Equation.(5.1)
and Equation.(5.4), the number of transactions coming from overall number of
nR roads and average processing time tB-1 can be derived as follows:
nT-All =
traffic amount
3600s/hour
× tCP×nR (6.1)
tB-1 = [nT-All× tV+(tBO+ tP)×2+ tprep+ tM]/tCP (6.2)
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To find the most suitable transaction collection time, several candidates are
prepared within a range with regular intervals, such as five candidates from 0.5
seconds to 1.0 second with spacing of 0.1 seconds. The estimated key transfer
time is calculated using various collection periods as inputs. The optimised trans-
action collection time is selected according to the minimum key transfer time:
argmin
tCP
tB-1 sub ject to : tCP ∈ [t1CP, tnCP]
To sum up, a transaction collection period optimisation algorithm is demon-
strated using pseudo-algorithm in Algorithm.4.
Algorithm 4 Optimise the Transaction Collection Period
Input: : Traffic amount on each road nH, n optional transaction collection periods (t1CP · · · tnCP)
Output: : Optimised transaction collection period tmCP
1: Initialise a data sink tB-1 = [t1CP · · · tnCP]
2: for (i = 1; i6 n; i++) do
3: Call Equation(6), calculate t iB-1 when tCP = t
i
CP and traffic amount
on each road is equal to nH;
4: tB-1[i]← t iB-1, record t iB-1 into the result sink;
5: end for
6: tmCP = min(tB-1), Find the minimum key transfer timeïijZ˙
7: return tmCP;
8: End Algorithm
6.2 Performance Evaluation
6.2.1 Experimental Assumptions and Setup
This section further studies the processing time in blockchain network against
different transaction collection periods. The network structure setup follows the
same structure of the DLT-based key management scheme in the previous con-
tribution. The network isolates the central manager away from major key man-
agement tasks, the central managers like PKI only responsible to generate crypto-
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graphic materials and pseudonyms. The middle layer infrastructure, SM, is intro-
duced into the network to support most of the key management job. The system
keeps using DLT-based key handover handshake procedures, dynamic transaction
collection periods are inserted into the scheme to provide better key management
flexibility. For each SM, cross-border is collected and picked into transaction
packet from every half second to one second in order to test the performance re-
garding different transaction collection length.
The simulations aim to test key transmission time under different traffic levels
and transaction collection periods. Here assumes that the system calculates the
overall number of cross-border activities at end of the collection periods. The ve-
hicle cross-border activities follow the exponential distribution. The cross-border
events occur rate follows the quantile function of exponential distribution [137].
Where i is the event number, λ is the rate of expected events, ti is the expected
events occurrence time, Pi is the probability following the normal distribution and
µ is the mean value of the exponential distribution.
ti =− ln(1 − Pi)λ , λ =
1
µ
Similar to the DLT-based scheme in the Chapter 5, the performances are de-
signed in various traffic levels. The low level is considered as relative mild traffic
level. higher traffic level is the stress testing under heavy traffic conditions to ex-
amine the scalability properties. The heavy traffic condition test aims to study the
performance within a big city. One purpose is to test the scalability. Another pur-
pose is to examine the future development space of the scheme as the large scale
deployment of VCS leads to a large number of transactions with the network. The
upper and the lower amount of vehicle traffic are considered under a saturated
traffic condition and off-peak traffic of big cities. The off-peak time has 3,000 ve-
hicles per hour, while the saturated traffic is set to have 15,000 vehicles passing a
road in an hour, aiming to examine our scheme under the worst case as well as the
heaviest burden of VCS. The topology of scenario here is assumed in the biggest
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Figure 6.1: Assumed Network Topology For Blockchain Network In The Dy-
namic DLT-Based System
cities in the world, such as Beijing. There are eight urban districts, therefore we
assume a 3×3 topology. As shown in Fig.6.1, each urban district is managed by
one SM. Security domains are connected to each other via two-way highways.
Here we assume each common edge has five two-way highways to connect to the
neighbour security domain. Thus there are overall 120 highways based on this
topology. For each SM, tCP is ranged from 0.5 seconds to one second in order to
test the performance regarding different transaction collection length.
6.2.2 Simulation Results
The various transaction collection period provides an interface to allow SMs to
control the number of picked transactions. Longer collection period collects more
transactions, and vice versa. Therefore different period lengths decide the amount
of transactions flooding into SM network. According to the assumptions in Fig.6.1,
highways on the topology are supposed to have roads for both directions, each
supporting one traffic flows on the road. Here takes a half side of a road with sin-
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Figure 6.2: Average Transaction Number Under Various Traffic Levels
gle traffic flow as a standard metric unit and simulate the average transactions in
a single traffic flow. Fig.6.2 plots the average transactions as a function of traffic
levels and transaction collection periods. The appeared transactions are generated
from a single-direction road. From the results in the figure, the appeared transac-
tion number is directly proportional to the traffic level. Moreover, the longer tCP,
the more transactions are caught by SMs. The average number of transactions per
tCP from each traffic flow is calculated as follows:
λ = nT/CP =
nH
3600
× tCP
Where nT/CP is the average number of key handover requests (also known as
the transactions) within each tCP and nH is the average number of vehicles (the
traffic level) passing on a road in each hour. The parameter nR is multiplied by the
nT/CP to get the average transaction number on all the roads, here nR is the number
of roads that are taken into calculation on the assumed topology.
Fig.6.3 Illustrates the key transfer performances under various collection pe-
riods. Here the results consider all the transactions within the highways in the as-
sumed topology (Fig.6.1). The result of 0.5 to 0.7 seconds increases steadily when
other results increase exponentially. It can be seen that mild exponential growth
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Figure 6.3: Key Transfer Time Under The Transaction Collection Periods
appears on the transaction collection period from 0.5 to 0.8 seconds. Marked
non-linear rise trend happens when the collection period longer than 0.8 seconds.
The above results indicate that longer collection period lets SMs to collect more
transactions, leading to heavier processing burden and tedious computation time.
According to the peak time traffic results in Fig.6.2, average 4.2 transactions
are captured within one second collection period when traffic level is equal to
15000 vehicles/hour/road, while average 3.3 transactions are captured within one
second time under the lower traffic level of 12000 vehicles/hour/road. This causes
transaction difference of 120× (4.2− 3.3) = 108 transactions, resulting in huge
difference of key transfer time. Based on the result in Fig.5.7 and Fig.5.8, the key
handover processing time increases exponentially with respect to the growth of
transaction number. Therefore the non-linear growth in the above figure is caused
by the increasing number of the collected transactions.
As mentioned in the algorithm description above, in order to measure the ef-
fect more accurately, it is necessary to have a unified measurement standard. The
scheme uses one second as a standard metric to make sure that every transaction
collection periods have the identical running time. To confirm the effectiveness of
the dynamic transaction collection period, the scheme has carried out a simulation
experiment to investigate the average processing time of key transfer in 1 second.
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Figure 6.4: Key Transfer Time Results Measured In One Second. (a) Key Trans-
ferring Time From Traffic Level Of 4500 To 10000 Vehicles/hour/road. (b) Key
Transferring Time Between Fixed And Collection Period Schemes
The running time of the dynamic transaction collection period simulation is set
to be one hour, multiple key transfer procedures under various collection periods
are recorded. The results are divided by 3600 seconds to measure the performance
in one second. The key part of the numerical results within the above one hour
simulation are shown in Fig.6.4(a). Along with the growth of traffic levels, the
minimum time results occur in different tCP values: Longer collection period gives
less key handover process time under mild traffic conditions. However, rapid col-
lection frequency and shorter collection intervals performance better under heavy
traffic burden. That means the length of the collection period can be adjusted in
terms of the traffic so that the key handover processing time can be minimised.
A more intuitive view of the results are shown in Fig.6.4(b). The figure not only
shows the time data of key handover procedures under different collection pe-
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riods, but also demonstrated results using dynamic transaction collection period
scheme. From the figure, it can be seen that the dynamic scheme always occupies
the minimum key transfer time among results. This is because the optimal choice
of collection periods are computed using Algorithm.4. The algorithm forces SMs
to select a tCP which forces the system to transfer keys with the minimum time
cost.
Figure 6.5: Decreased Key Transfer Time In Percentage
The trustworthiness of an algorithm is proved by comparing with benchmark
schemes. Here the benchmark is selected as the DLT-based key management
scheme in the Chapter 5. The Chapter 5 proves that the DLT-based scheme can
provide better key handover performance over the conventional schemes. The
effectiveness and trustworthiness of the dynamic collection periods can be fur-
ther confirmed by showing better performance over the static collection period
scheme. For this reason, the time-saving performances of the dynamic scheme is
studied. Fig.6.5 plots the average decreased time as a function of various traffic
levels. The transaction collection period tCP ranges from half to one second at
0.1 seconds intervals. The higher transaction collection frequency causes lower
proportion of decreased time under the heavier traffic level. In contrast, infrequent
transaction collection times guide to a larger proportion of decreased time at mild
traffic levels. Albeit fewer handshakes, longer collection period takes more than
10% of time cost to finish key transfer at peak traffic level. Thus, for higher traffic
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levels, using a shorter tCP becomes an economic selection to release the computa-
tion burden and improve system efficiency. Shorter collection period, on the other
hand, consumes more time to transfer transactions at low traffic situations.
6.3 Summary
In this chapter, a dynamic algorithm has been introduced into the DLT-based key
management scheme to help the key handover between heterogeneous VCS net-
works. The performance of the DLT-based scheme has been optimised using dy-
namic transaction collection periods. The proposed blockchain structure allows
key transfer securely within the decentralised SM network and the transaction
collection period further shrinks the key transfer time of blockchain scheme. An
algorithm and corresponding equations of how to decide the optimised transaction
collection period have illustrated to give the basic theory support of the scheme.
The simulation in this chapter first proves the processing time of key handover
increases exponentially with respect to traffic by considering the traffic levels from
3000 to 15000 vehicles per hour. In other words, the key handover time increases
exponentially in terms of the growth of the collected transaction number. Sec-
ondly, results of vehicle traffic condition under large international city further
confirms the exponential growth trend. Last but not least, the dynamic scheme
is compared with the benchmark static scheme. The results have shown the min-
imum key handover processing time under different traffic levels appear under
different transaction collection period lengths. Moreover, the results of the aver-
age decreased process time have illustrated the dynamic scheme achieves better
efficiency and robustness compared to the static scheme.
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Chapter 7
Conclusions and Future Work
7.1 Conclusions
The research background and the technologies related to the key management
schemes have been presented in the Chapter 2 and Chapter 3. The related Intel-
ligent Transportation System (ITS) and Vehicular Communication System (VCS)
technologies, from the bottom layer to the top layer, have been briefly displayed
in this thesis. Three contributions have been presented which are focusing on the
key management schemes. The Group Key Management (GKM) and key han-
dover scheme are two aspects of the key management scheme. The first contri-
bution focus on both aspects, which the rest of the contributions aim at the key
handover scheme. The relationship between contributions and key management
fields is illustrated in Fig.7.1.
In this thesis, an advanced key management scheme for secure group commu-
nication in VCS environment has proposed as the first contribution. The proposed
scheme attaches the leaving probability of vehicles to the benchmark scheme
which is based on the Logical Key Hierarchy (LKH) structure and the Batch
Rekeying (BR) idea. The probability-based approach helps the key manager de-
cide how to organise vehicle nodes on the key tree. Three components have in-
volved in the scheme, including the GKM scheme, key initial registration and
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Figure 7.1: Relationship Between Contributions And Key Management Fields
key handover. The reorganised key tree gathers all the vehicles with similar leav-
ing probabilities within a small area on the key tree. Simultaneously, a model of
vehicle registration has demonstrated. The simulation evaluation has been con-
ducted using OMNeT++ simulator. The results have proved that the probability-
based scheme gives many steady performances comparing to the benchmark in
[66] under the sudden departure and sudden joining situations. Less fluctuation
in rekeying costs is witnessed in the proposed scheme and overall rekeying cost
is saved around 20% in the proposed probability-based scheme comparing to the
benchmark scheme.
A novel, decentralised and simplified network structure has been presented
and implemented in the simulations in the second and the third contributions. The
structure uses Distributed Ledger Technology (DLT) and blockchain to simplify
the structure. Three algorithms have been raised to specify the blockchain mining
procedures, proof-of-work calculation and optimised collection period computa-
tion, respectively. The simplified structure avoids the handover procedures from
passing the third party central authorities. This helps to reduce the key handover
time. In the third contribution, the scheme is optimised using the dynamic trans-
action collection periods to dynamically adjust various traffic levels. Both the
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contributions share the similar network structure, which has been built in OM-
NeT++ with traffic simulator Veins.
The simulation results have shown that the key transmission cost in blockchain
network holds steady, that means better scalability. The blockchain based scheme
costs less same-domain handover time than the benchmark handover scheme in
Chapter 4 when the transaction number less than 1300. While the blockchain
based scheme performances better cross-domain handover results comparing to
the results in traditional structure if the transaction number no more than 2000.
Moreover, the conventional scheme gives longer processing time comparing to
the proposed scheme within the transaction range from 0 to 2000. For the third
contribution, the results prove that the key handover processing time increases
exponentially regards to the growth of traffic levels. In addition, the simulation
outcome also shows that the longer transaction collection period saves 10% of the
key handover time under heavy traffic level. Around 5% key handover time is
saved under mild traffic level.
7.2 Future Work
In addition to test the performance of the simulation tools (NS3, OMNeT++, etc),
the measurable benefits of the blockchain-based Key management scheme should
be verified against existing methods using a real testbed. The scheme can be
improved by taking the second contribution as the foundation platform. The dy-
namic collection period algorithm will be optimised to further improve the com-
putation speed in order to adapt the variable traffic levels in ITS and VCS. As
the performance evaluation in this thesis only involves in the software simulation,
the scheme will further practice examination. A model for a dynamically decen-
tralised key management system will be realised, built and evaluated on a testbed
to measure the performance on real devices.
1. Pseudonym Management Using DLT.
In addition to the security, another issue that matters in the VCS is the privacy
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problems. The future blueprint of the Internet of Things (IoT) assumes to connect
everything, including the details of human life. For this reason, people’s private
information (e.g. Bank information, personal timetable, movement footprints or
HTTP cookie) is threated by malicious users among IoT environment. Moreover,
privacy protection avoids an IoT device from concentrated attacks, as the adver-
saries unable to focus their attack on a specific device. In order to address the
privacy problem, the future work will focus to further take privacy issues into
consideration, including the investigation of a system which provides both se-
curity and privacy. The future work will be developed as an extension work of
the current contributions. The extension of the work aims at pseudonym man-
agement using DLT scheme based on the current system. Specifically speaking,
the planned future work aims at pseudonym management using blockchain based
on the current system. Moreover, users are able to decide the trade-off between
security and privacy.
2. Pseudonym and Pseudonym Certificate Swapping Using DLT.
A Pseudonym and Pseudonym Certificate swap scheme realised with DLT
will be designed. The scheme aims to shuffle a large amount of pseudonym re-
lated materials among a large ITS and VCS coverage area. The blockchain-based
scheme combines all the mixed zones within ITS coverage territories into a com-
bined mixed zone pool and further enhances privacy. The blockchain will help
the scheme to decrease the production burden of pseudonym-related materials,
as well as accelerate the pseudonym shuffling procedures. Based on the system
model developed above, the blockchain based privacy protection scheme will be
added to the DLT-based key management system. Due to the nature of DLT, the
blocks on the blockchain are capable to carry multiple transactions. Fortunately,
the transaction can carry not only rekeying materials for the security purpose, but
pseudonym exchange data for privacy purpose as well. In this case, the scheme
will use the same blockchain ledger to convey both the rekeying materials and the
pseudonym exchange data. Results of the privacy protection scheme will be anal-
ysed with reference to existing pseudonym shuffling schemes, to assess gained
benefits for privacy, network efficiency, and so forth. The new design will be
realised and evaluated within the testbed or road test.
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Develop a framework for BLT-based key management scheme that allows ro-
bust engineering of domain specific blockchains for IoT systems that support VCS
scenario. To sum up, the future plan for this thesis includes:
• A Blockchain-enabled, efficient, and scalable exchange Key management scheme
for VCS. The dynamic key management will be proposed based on the op-
timised dynamic transaction collection algorithm.
• A Blockchain mediated approach to location verification using VCS AP infras-
tructures and upper layer manager infrastructures in a privacy preserving
manner.
• A scalable privacy management scheme through pseudonyms and pseudonym
certificates management.
• Novel verification and analysis techniques for validating DLT designs.
• New sets of DLT-based scheme simulation results about transactions more than
1000 and dynamic blockchain idea.
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Appendix A
A Brief Introduction Of OMNeT++
Simulator
The appendix presents the brief introduction of OMNeT++ simulator environ-
ment. The graphical user interface is shown in the Fig.A.1. Fig.A.2 and Fig.A.3
illustrates the structure of node module in OMNeT++ and the node configura-
tion, respectively. Fig.A.4 shows the parameter configuration of the entire simu-
lated scenario. The simulation interface is demonstrated in Fig.A.5. An example
of the traditional Vehicular Communication System (VCS) structure is shown in
Fig.A.6, Fig.A.7 and Fig.A.8.
In the Fig.A.1, the project can be selected at the left of the graphical user
interface. The code of the simulation or algorithm can be edited at the main body
of the simulator. The compile process, errors and results are shown at the bottom.
In the Fig.A.2, the module structure of the Security Manager (SM) consists of
an application layer module, two lower layer module which connect to the Road
Side Unit (RSU) and other infrastructures, respectively. The mobility module
is used to control the position of the SM. Fig.A.3 gives the code to configure
technical parameters of the SM, including to the port connections and the SM
position.
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Figure A.1: Graphical User Interface Of OMNeT++
Figure A.2: The Node Module Structure In OMNeT++
Fig.A.4 is the main configuration of the entire simulation, which allows user
to specify the parameters of the simulation, such as the number of nodes, transmit
power, the size of the simulated area and the position of the infrastructures.
The simulation window is shown in the Fig.A.5. The bottom left corner of the
window shows all the nodes in the current scenario. Message handshake records
are shown in the bottom sub-window. The topology of the scenario is placed at the
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Figure A.3: Parameter Configuration Of Node Module In OMNeT++
main position. At the top of the window is a brief timeline of the ongoing events
of the simulation.
Fig.A.6, Fig.A.7 and Fig.A.8 shows the situations of no communication, mes-
sage unicast and message broadcast. An arrow line is used in OMNeT++ to show
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Figure A.4: Parameter Configuration Of The Entire Simulation
Figure A.5: The OMNeT++ Simulation Window
the message propagation, the beginning of the arrow line is the message sender,
while the ending of the arrow line is the message receiver.
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Figure A.6: Simulation With No Communication Between Nodes
Figure A.7: Simulation With Unicast Communication Between Nodes
Figure A.8: Simulation With Broadcast Communication Between Nodes
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